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I. INTRODUCTION
To be a professional society is to have rules.' What distinguishes a
group of professionals from mere purveyors, merchants, and
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. I thank Joe Kattan and William
H. Page for thoughtful comments. I also acknowledge a special debt of gratitue to Joseph
Simons. Many of the ideas contained in the article emerged from long and occasionally
arduous discussions we had while analyzing cases at the Federal Trade Commission. I
am, of course, solely responsible for the views expressed here.
1. See, e.g., W. MOORE, THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULES 117 (1970) (Codes
of conduct "are an almost universal feature of professional and quasi-professional
tradespeople is a perception among the group, which can be exported
to consumers of their services, that they adhere to standards of ad-
mission and behavior that somehow separate them from non-profes-
sionals. At the least, a professional association would like to believe
that its members conform to some norms that set them apart from
others.
Two still recent strains in the evolving economic analysis of behav-
ior bear upon the proper approach to professional rules. They not
only bear upon it, they run head long into each other. First, the
firmly established economic capture theory of regulation posits that
government regulation is a good that is provided in accordance with
the fundamental laws of supply and demand.' A group of suppliers,
including suppliers of professional services, may attempt to obtain
regulation from the government to serve their economic interests at
the expense of others, usually consumers. An extension of this theory
is that subgroups of suppliers may demand regulation that benefits
them at the expense of other suppliers, as well as consumers.
The capture theory began as an explanation of government action,
whereas professional codes can be adopted by private associations.
However, public and private action tend to blend in the realm of
ethical norms. A code may begin as the child of an association and
be adopted by a government entity, thereafter claiming legitimacy
from both sources and growing old under the influence of both. In-
deed, professional societies sometimes attempt to attract members by
stressing that they lobby government officials for regulation
favorable to the profession.3 In the last few years, some scholars
have advanced the idea that suppliers of a product or service can act
privately to raise the costs of supply to increase their rents at the
expense of consumers.4 This theory does not depend upon govern-
ment action, and given the right circumstances, a professional code
can be explained as a device manipulated to achieve the desired
result.
associations").
2. See generally Stigler, THE THEORY OF EcONOMIc REGULATION, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971); Posnei, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335 (1974); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administra-
tive Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975); Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of
Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211 (1976). The possibility of economic capture has led
one commentator to suggest a state action doctrine of antitrust immunity that distin-
guishes between anticompetitive state acts that are the product of capture and those that
are not. See Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARv. L. REV. 713
(1986).
3. On the evolution of lobbying efforts by professional associations, see C. GILB,
HIDDEN HIERARCHIES: THE PROFESSIONS AND GOVERNMENT 143-51 (1966).
4. See, e.g., Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion Raising Rivals'
Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986) [hereinafter Krattenmaker
& Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion].
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The economic capture theory fits snugly, both historically and con-
ceptually, into a legal and economic tradition that was hostile to hor-
izontal agreements,5 even if it fits into other traditions as well. The
classic manifestation of that tradition was Adam Smith's paranoia
over intercourse among competitors, even meetings for "merriment
and diversion." 6 Someone suspicious of all horizontal cooperation
and particularly that supported by government regulation is likely to
view codes of professional associations as an inviting antitrust target.
However, professional rules may also be considered in light of the
economic theory of property rights, a theory that is as well respected
among proponents of economic analysis as is the capture theory.7
The property theory rests on the premise that social value can in-
crease through private investment. However, the investment will not
be made unless investors can expect to recoup their economic costs,
which means appropriating at least some of the enhanced value. In
short, investors have to suppress rampant free riding. In theory, in-
vestors could agree with all potential free riders that they will not
free ride, and to the extent the agreements are enforceable, obtain a
sufficient measure of private security. But the transaction costs asso-
ciated with a contractual approach to property rights are likely to
make such a strategy economically unfeasible. Hence, the state steps
in to define property rights when externalities frustrate value maxi-
mizing investments and cannot efficiently be eliminated through pri-
vate arrangements.
Thus, the economic essence of a property system is to induce
value-increasing investments by discouraging free riding. Profession-
als may invest in cultivating a demand for their services by increas-
ing at least the perceived quality of those services. When information
is costly to acquire, some professionals may be able to appropriate
the value of the enhanced demand without providing the quality of
services that generated the greater demand. In the long run, all of
the members of the profession as well as consumers will suffer as the
value of the services erodes. A code of ethics may represent a private
5. For references to manifestations of the "inhospitality tradition of antitrust," a
phrase attributed to Donald Turner, see Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1984).
6. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 128 (Modern Library 1937) ("People of
the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conver-
sation ends in ... some contrivance to raise prices.").
7. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 29-75 (3rd ed. 1986);
EcONOMIc FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (B. Ackerman ed. 1975); R. COOTER & T.
ULEN. LAW AND ECONOMIcS 88-210 (1988); De Alessi, The Economics of Property
Rights: A Review of the Evidence, 2 REs. L. & ECON. 1 (1980).
agreement among professionals that they will not free ride on each
other's investments in increasing the value of their services. If the
value lost on account of free riding is not sufficient to justify the
administrative cost of the state defining property rights, a private
arrangement may be the only efficient method of stimulating produc-
tive investments.
The fact that the association may enlist the aid of the state, per-
haps by persuading the government to adopt its code as a regulatory
scheme, does not necessarily mean that the association is attempting
to secure anticompetitive rents. A code that enhances efficiency as a
private response to free riding still needs to be enforced. A profes-
sional society may want to avoid the private costs of enforcement by
persuading the government to assume those costs. Moreover, the
power of a private association to prevent -free riding is limited. If a
member violates an ethical rule, he or she may be expelled. How-
ever, if membership signals quality, non-members who do not invest
in providing services of the same quality will have an incentive to
pass themselves off as members. To the extent that identifying mem-
bership is costly for consumers, non-members may be able to free
ride on the investments of members, and increase the association's
costs of educating consumers. After all, the association cannot expel
someone who does not belong to it.
Therefore, the association may turn to the state to suppress free
riding more effectively than it can. One method of protecting mem-
bers' investments is to have the state protect the association's trade-
mark. The efficacy of this approach depends upon consumer recogni-
tion of the trademark and their willingness to distinguish between
"certified" and "uncertified" professionals. This approach also, at
least partially, depends upon the investment the association makes in
promoting the trademark.
Another way the state might suppress free riding is to force all
suppliers to provide high quality services. Of course, to the extent
that low quality service substitutes for high quality service, the de-
mand for high quality service and the profits of high quality provid-
ers will increase if low quality service is eliminated. Therefore, an
association's attempt to persuade the state to eliminate competing
services may represent anticompetitive rent-seeking behavior or ef-
forts to deter welfare-reducing free riding.
Moreover, the Chicago school movement that infused economic
analysis into the antitrust laws began to recognize that horizontal
cooperation is not always harmful. Coordination among competitors,
or networking, can increase economic welfare by reducing the supply
costs. Just as a merger can increase efficiency by integrating the as-
sets of the firms, a horizontal agreement can increase efficiency by
[VOL. 28: 301. 1991] Antitrust
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working a partial integration of economic functions." -
It is ironic that disciples of economic analysis can resort to
precepts of equal stature in either attacking or defending the ethical
codes of professional associations. Government involvement in a sys-
tem of ethics does not necessarily indicate whether the association's
activities increase or decrease welfare. Scholars who disavow an effi-
ciency model of antitrust interpretation are likely to be suspicious of
private codes of ethics. They are also likely to subscribe to a public
interest theory of regulation. These individuals would tend to prefer
a state's code of professional behavior to one that is strictly the prod-
uct of private agreement. Curiously enough, efficiency-based scholars
who fear capture, though they too would be suspicious of ethical
codes, would prefer a strictly private arrangement to one adopted by
the government. Economic scholars who are concerned about free
riding would find government involvement ambiguous.
In the end, we cannot simply declare that all professional codes
are either efficiency-enhancing or efficiency-reducing, turn off the
lights, and go home. This Article will first sketch the background of
the legal and economic problem. It will next set out the anticompeti-
tive theories of professional rules, and then the procompetitive, or
welfare-enhancing explanations. The last section of the Article de-
rives principles from this discussion and uses them to suggest a
method of analysis for distinguishing anticompetitive rules from
procompetitive ones.
II. THE NATURE OF PROFESSIONAL RULES
No definition of the term "profession" has ever been universally
accepted, and this Article does not attempt to offer one.9 One scholar
wrote, "To define 'profession' is to invite controversy." 10 Part of the
reason for the lack of a common definition is that many disciplines
8. One could summarize the last twenty years of antitrust evolution as follows,
without doing too much damage to reality: All agreements were suspect. Chicago-school
scholars argued that vertical arrangements were good and horizontal arrangements were
bad. Another group of economists, to the cheers of traditional antitrust lawyers, argued
that vertical arrangements really are bad. The Chicago-school then said horizontal ar-
rangements may be good too. The war now rages on two fronts - what vertical arrange-
ments are bad, and what horizontal arrangements are good?
9. One commentator concluded, "There is a rather extensive literature of defini-
tions of profession. Research into these writings reveals no general agreement on any
'authoritative' statement." Cogan, The Problem of Defining a Profession, 297 ANUALS
Am. ACAD. POL. AND Soc. Sci., ETHICAL STANDARDS AND PROF. CONDUCT 105 (B. Lan-
dis ed. 1955) [hereinafter ETHICAL STANDARDS].
10. Id.
have studied the phenomenon of a profession, including philosophy,
sociology, political science, history, and economics. The emerging
definitions naturally reflect the distinct perspectives and purposes of
the particular discipline. One commentator ventured the following
definition in 1926: "A profession consists of a limited and clearly
marked group of men who are trained by education and experience
to perform certain functions better than their fellowmen."' In 1915,
a social scientist proposed six criteria that identify a profession: "(1)
intellectual operations coupled with large individual responsibilities,
(2) raw materials drawn from science and learning, (3) practical ap-
plication, (4) an educationally communicable technique, (5) ten-
dency toward self-organization, and (6) increasingly altruistic
motivation."' 2
If one cannot successfully define what a profession is, one will not
easily be able to describe what it is not. In particular, acclaim will
not greet any effort to distinguish a profession from a trade. 3 Cer-
tainly at one time, the term profession was commonly associated
only with the "learned" professions, such as law and medicine, occu-
pations that require formal, post-secondary education.14 Though not
similar in all important respects, in many respects that economists
find important, lawyers and physicians are indistinguishable from
barbers, opticians, and watchmakers.1 "
11. C. TAEUSCH, PROFESSIONAL AND BUSINESS ETHICS 13 (1926).
12. Flexner, Is Social Work a Profession?, 1 Sch. & Soc'y 904 (1915), quoted in
Cogan, supra note 9, at 106. For a description of attempts by British commentators to
define "profession" and an attempt at synthesizing them, see G. MILLERSON, THE QUALI-
FYING ASSOCIATIONS: A STUDY IN PROFESSIONALIZATION 1-13 (1964).
13. The Supreme Court once observed that the "classic basis traditionally ad-
vanced to distinguish professions from trades, businesses, and other occupations" is that
"enhancing profit is not the goal of professional activities; the goal is to provide services
necessary to the community." Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786 (1975).
14. One scholar has explained that in England, before the industrial age, young
men in the upper classes were not likely to enter the trades, by becoming a blacksmith,
carpenter, tailor, or shopkeeper, because commercial morality was not high and because
those occupations did not pay enough. W. READER, PROFESSIONAL MEN: THE RISE OF
THE PROFESSIONAL CLASSES IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 6 (1966). Rather, the
occupations considered suitable for most "gentlemen" were
the 'liberal professions', and of those there were only three: divinity, physic,
and law.
'Profession', by itself, was a word that could be used of any 'calling, voca-
tion, known employment' . . . and it frequently turns up in the phrase
'mechanical professions', meaning the trades of skilled workmen. The force of
much that later came to be absorbed into the word 'profession' was carried in
the adjective 'liberal', which meant that the essential qualification for entry
into any of these three occupations, which were sometimes also called the
'learned' professions, was a liberal education: that is, the education of a gen-
tleman, not of a trader or an artisan.
Id. at 9-10.
15. The problem of distinguishing professions from other occupations is noted by
one scholar in a recent economic survey of government regulation of occupations in the
United States. See S. YOUNG, THE RULE OF EXPERTS: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN
(VOL. 28: 301, 1991] Antitrust
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Fortunately, the analysis in this Article does not require a precise
definition. The analysis contemplates that a profession generally has
the following attributes: Practitioners provide a service, rather than
supply a product. They usually provide their service directly to con-
sumers, at least the demand side of the market is atomistic. The
ability to provide the service, as well as the manner in which it is
provided, are commonly regulated by the government, but entry into
the occupation by legally-qualified individuals is otherwise rather
easy. Finally, the individual is often the economic entity supplying
the service, though individuals also combine to form firms. In any
event, the supply side of the market is also atomistic. As is clear
from this list, the term "profession" is used in this Article to denote
what are commonly considered professions and some less traditional
professionals.16
Professionals tend to form associations. These private associations
establish rules that prescribe requirements for initial membership, or
eligibility requirements. This Article addresses only those associa-
tions comprised primarily of members of the profession, that is, those
that are made up of competitors. The eligibility requirements of any
such association implicitly incorporate any qualifications imposed by
law for engaging in the profession. In theory, the association need
AMERICA 1-4 (1987). He chose to use the terms "profession" and "occupation" inter-
changeably to avoid obscuring "the true economic forces at work in the regulation of
occupational activity." Id. at 4.
16. In their papers explaining an anticompetitive theory of association rules, dis-
cussed infra at notes 80-88 and accompanying text, Langenfeld and Morris assert that
their analysis is applicable to any horizontal agreement. See Langenfeld & Morris, Rent
Increasing Costs: The Antitrust Implications from a Paradox in Value Theory, Bureau
of Econ., Fed. Trade Commission, Working Paper No. 182 (Nov. 1990) [hereinafter
Langenfeld & Morris, Rent Increase Costs:]; Langenfeld & Morris, Analyzing Agree-
ments Among Competitors: What Does the Future Hold?, (Paper presented at the Con-
temporary Policy Session of the Western Economic Association's 65th Annual Confer-
ence, San Diego, California) (June 1990) [hereinafter Langenfeld & Morris, Analyzing
Agreements]. Whether the mode of analysis suggested in this Article could be extended
to any horizontal agreement, has not been carefully considered herein. However, as a
general matter, national trade associations consisting of firms with relatively high fixed
costs selling tangible products tend not to have sufficient power to force members to
comply with a code of conduct. These associations typically have not secured government
adoption of their rules. And membership in the association has not been significant
enough commercially that a firm would be economically compelled to adhere to the asso-
ciation's code. Thus, a firm that could profit by engaging in conduct prohibited by such
an association's code would likely leave the group.
The rules used as examples throughout the Article are generally taken from the codes
of professions as that term is described in the text. Occasionally, however, an association
is used that does not correspond to the criteria indicated because the rule happens to
illustrate a point particularly well or the nature of the group is not obvious. Given that
these rules are used merely as examples, little harm is thereby done.
not impose any additional eligibility requirement, though virtually
all associations at least require the payment of an initiation fee or
dues. However, an association may establish eligibility requirements
that far exceed legal mandates. An association may constitute a very
large or very small percentage of a profession. Accordingly, the pro-
portion of any relevant market consisting of members may be large
or small.
The rules of professional associations also typically contain restric-
tions on the conduct of members, commonly called rules of ethics,
but the nature, scope, and detail of these conduct restrictions vary
enormously among associations.17 Codes of ethics can range from lit-
tle more than a declaration that members will discharge their "du-
ties with accuracy, thoughtfulness, and care,"' 8 to elaborate state-
ments of principles and conduct imperatives, supported by case
hypotheticals and commentary. 19 Thus, ethical rules can command,
prohibit, allow, encourage, exhort, or discourage behavior. They can
specify obligations that are also imposed by statute, administrative
regulation, or the common law. Indeed, they can simply state explic-
itly that members will comply with the law.20 An association may
establish rules that are later adopted by a government authority,
17. One scholar, after surveying a variety of ethics codes, defined the following
four types:
(1) The code which is a collection of specific rules of conduct, worded so as to apply with
definiteness to situations faced by the members of the profession.... (2) One which is a
collection of two types of articles - precise definitions of situations and what may be
termed general principles or remote ideals. . . .(3) One which is a collection solely of
general principles which set no standards and which cannot be classified as specific rules.
(4) One which consists of general principles which are constantly applied to situa-
tions through the rulings of a practice committee that attempts to accumulate precedents
or a body of common law.
B. LANDIS, PROFESSIONAL CODES: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE APPLICA-
TIONS TO THE EDUCATIONAL PROFESSION 87-88 (Contributions to Education No. 267,
1927).
18. See, Code of Ethics of the American Society of Medical Technology, reprinted
in J. CLAPP, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND INSIGNIA 439 (1974). The principle provisions of
another code, adopted in 1921, enjoined the association's members, inter alia, to develop
"in business the spirit of the Golden Rule," to "establish the spoken word on the basis of
the written bond," and tor "assist liberally and sympathetically all that seeks to elevate
humanity by charity of action and thought and by justice to all men through the 'Square
Deal'." I could not resist contriving some excuse to mention that organization, which was
made up of lumbermen, because of its name - the Concatenated Order of Hoe-Hoo.
See E. HEERMANCE, CODES OF ETHICS: A HANDBOOK 311-12 (1924). My only fear is
that the reference will inspire the reader to sum up this Article as some other assemblage
of hoo-hoo.
19. See, e.g., the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Associa-
tion or the Code of Professional Practice of the American Society of Landscape Archi-
tects, the 1962 version of which is reported in J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at 396-402.
20. 'Of particular relevance to this Article is a provision of the Code of Ethics of
the Professional Photographers of America: "I will at all times avoid the use of unfair
competitive practices as determined by any court of competent jurisdiction, the Federal
anti-trust laws and related statutes." J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at 559.
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then rescind or retain them. Conversely it may adopt a state's prior
restrictions or adopt restrictions simultaneously with the state. 1 Cer-
tainly the restrictions may specify obligations that are not founded
on any requirement of law. Indeed, the purpose of this Article is to
identify restrictions that violate the antitrust laws.
Associations vary in the extent to which they enforce their rules.
Some associations specify conduct restrictions but create no formal
enforcement mechanism.2 "Obligations" that are not enforced have
little relevance to an analysis of the antitrust implications of profes-
sional rules. 3 For agreements among competitors to be exclusionary,
they must be enforced against the disadvantaged rivals. As Judge
Easterbrook has written, "There can be no restraint of trade without
a restraint. ' 24 Collusive agreements, those designed to raise price
merely by consensual action of the parties to them, may be at-
tempted without an enforcement provision, but they are likely to be
short-lived. The incentive to cheat either by shading price or avoid-
ing costly business practices will become irresistible. In any event, it
is unlikely that a group of competitors would attempt to effectuate a
cartel agreement through an association and not enforce the pact. 25
Therefore, the following discussion only covers rules that are en-
forced. A private association may use a variety of sanctions to en-
force its rules, including reprimand or suspension,26 but the ultimate
and decisive club that an association wields is dismissal from mem-
bership. If private sanctions are not effective, the association may
turn to the state for help.
Conduct restrictions contained in a code of ethics need not be en-
forced according to their terms. A particular rule may be competi-
21. The term "state" is used throughout this Article as a synonym for any govern-
ment authority. As a matter of fact, the regulation of professions in this country is gener-
ally the province of state government, accomplished through legislation and administra-
tive regulation, rather than federal government.
22. See, e.g., the American Personnel and Guidance Association, discussed in J.
CLAPP, supra note 18, at 202-03; the American Society of Chartered Life Underwriters,
id. at 374; and the National Funeral Directors Association, id. at 314.
23. See generally, W. Moore, supra note 1, at 119 ("[w]ithout review and enforce-
ment mechanisms, professional codes may be little more than window dressing, perhaps
more designed to give false comfort to the laity than to guide the practitioner.").
24. Schachar v. Am. Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397, 397 (7th
Cir. 1989).
25. For a discussion of private methods of enforcing cartel agreements, see
Lopatka, The Case for Legal Enforcement of Price Fixing Agreements, 38 EMORY L. J.
1, 8-24 (1989).
26. See, e.g., the National Society of Interior Designers, discussed in J. CLAPP,
supra note 18, at 385-86.
tively ambiguous, but enforced in an anticompetitive way. At the ex-
treme, an association can enforce an obligation that is not found in a
written code or even one that directly contradicts a written rule. For
antitrust purposes, the restriction is that which is enforced. The rules
examined in this Article are contained in association codes, however
the reader must bear in mind that welfare-enhancing written obliga-
tions do not necessarily increase welfare in practice.
This article concerns rules of private professional associations
which govern eligibility and subsequent conduct when enforced.17
The object is to formulate a method of determining what rules de-
crease economic welfare and are therefore good candidates for anti-
trust condemnation. To do this, this Article will also assess the wel-
fare-enhancing potential of these rules. First, the anticompetitive
theories.
27. Throughout the Article, actual written rules of associations are used to illus-
trate points. Association codes are normally revised over time, and the rules identified are
taken from codes of various eras. For purposes of this analysis, early codes, especially
those in force prior to 1950 or so, can be more illuminating than older ones. Rules
adopted before associations perceived that they could violate the antitrust laws are likely
to tell more about whether they should violate those laws, whether the rules were effi-
cient. Today an association might avoid adopting an efficient rule, or adopt a less efficient
alternative, only because it fears antitrust liability. In 1950, the Supreme Court held that
price fixing by real estate brokers was a per se antitrust violation. United States v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 492 (1950). In 1975, the Court held
that price fixing by attorneys violated the antitrust laws. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 788 (1975). Yet in Goldfarb, the Court acknowledged that "until the present
case, it is clear that we have not attempted to decide whether the practice of a learned
profession falls within § 1 of the Sherman Act." Id. at 786 n.15. At least associations of
"learned" professionals, then, were not sure that their rules could violate the antitrust
laws until 1975, though they and other professional societies should have been concerned
by 1950.
Clearly the associations of learned professionals in this country had codes long before
1950. The first code of the American Medical Association was adopted in 1848. See B.
Landis, supra note 17, at 41. The American Bar Association adopted cannons of ethics
in 1908. Id. at 26. The American Society of Civil Engineers was founded in 1852 and
adopted a code. See C. TAEUSCH, supra note 11 at 100. The American Association of
Engineers followed and adopted a code in 1915. See B. LANDIS, supra note 17, at 54. The
American Institute of Architects adopted canons of ethics in 1909. See Cummings, Stan-
dards of Professional Practice in Architecture, in ETHICAL STANDARDS, supra note 9, at
12. Many trade associations, however, appear to have adopted codes of conduct in the
twenties. The impetus for these codes has been attributed to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, which in November of 1918 began to invite members of entire industries to submit
in concrete form their conclusions about competitive practices they considered unfair.
See R. CABOT, ADVENTURES ON THE BORDERLANDS OF ETHICS 77 (1926). See also the
Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30,
1920, at 43. It is ironic that the FTC has recently targeted trade associations for anti-
trust scrutiny. See Prepared Remarks of Kevin J. Arquit, Director, Bureau of Competi-
tion, Federal Trade Commission, before the Chicago Bar Association Antitrust Law
Committee (Jan. 17, 1990).
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III. ANTICOMPETITIVE THEORIES OF PROFESSIONAL RULES
A number of anticompetitive theories have been offered either to
explain or because they have clear application to horizontal restric-
tions on either the conduct of professionals or their ability to prac-
tice. As used here, the term "anticompetitive" refers to a decrease, in
economic welfare, or the total of consumer and producer surplus,
that results from a restraint. It is possible for economic welfare to
shrink even when consumer welfare is unchanged. It is also possible
to hypothesize that competitors have a profit incentive to effectuate a
.restraint that reduces producer welfare but does not affect consumer
surplus,28 though all the theories described below predict a loss of
consumer welfare.
This article begins its discussion of anticompetitive theories with
the most traditional. No attempt is made in this section, or the next,
to assess whether a. theory is a viable explanation for all common
ethical rules. Rather, common restrictions are selected to illustrate
the applicability of each theory based upon their most obvious ef-
fects. Some restraints will appear to have little to do with some theo-
ries; conversely, some theories could apply to the same restraint. The
importance of identifying the most likely explanation for a restric-
tion is discussed in Section V.
A. Fixing Price Above Marginal Cost
The classic explanation for a horizontal restraint on competition is
that it enables suppliers to raise prices above marginal cost and re-
duce output, ideally to supply the quantity identified by the intersec-
tion of marginal cost and marginal revenue and to charge the corre-
sponding price.29 The result is illustrated in Figure 1.30 The
28. A restraint conceivably could increase the profits of a particular supplier or
group of suppliers yet reduce the profits of the remaining suppliers more than an offset-
ting amount. If the changes in these profits are caused by changes in marginal costs
while the price and quality-adjusted output of the industry remain unaffected, producer
but not consumer welfare would decline. The restraint would not be in the interests of
suppliers as a group, but the suppliers that would stand to gain may be able to secure the
restraint against the opposition of the other suppliers. This postulate is essentially a vari-
ant of the raising rivals' costs theory discussed below, in that under both hypotheses a
restraint causes some suppliers to gain and others to lose. The difference is that the
conventional raising rivals' costs explanation predicts a loss of consumer welfare.
29. Any microeconomics or industrial organization textbook will provide an analy-
sis of the cartel model. See, e.g., D. CARLTON & J. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL OR-
GANIZATION 209-11 (1990); H. KOHLER, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMIcs: THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 321-35 (1982). See also H. HOVENKAMP, EcONOMICS AND FEDERAL AN-
TITRUST LAW 1-19 (1985).
restriction does not affect the industry demand curve but does cause
price to increase from Pc to Pro, and quantity to decrease from qe to
qm. This change produces the familiar deadweight loss represented
by triangle ABC and a transfer of wealth from consumers to produc-
ers represented by rectangle PmACPc. Suppliers have an incentive to





An obvious example of this kind of restriction is an agreement to
fix the price of some service, such as an agreement among attorneys
to charge specified fees for title searches and other common legal
services. In essence, this was the allegation in Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar.31 Similarly, United States v. National Association of
Real Estate Boards32 involved an alleged agreement among real es-
tate brokers to charge specified commissions for brokerage services.
For this theory to work, the professional association that adopts
the restraint must have market power vis-a-vis non-member profes-
sionals.33 In other words, the association members must face a down-
30. The supply curve in Figure 1 is drawn as a horizontal line at p,. The analysis of
this anticompetitive theory would not be affected if the supply curve sloped upward.
31. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 775-76 (1975) (County bar associa-
tion published a schedule of recommended minimum prices for common legal services,
including 1 percent of the value of the property involved for a title examination).
32. United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 488 (1950).
33. Technically, market power requires that the cartelists have power with respect
to the service whose price is fixed. If consumers can costlessly substitute a different ser-
vice for that whose price is set by the cartel, the association will have no market power
even if membership in the association is required to provide the cartelized service. For
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ward sloping demand curve; the more steeply sloped the demand
curve, the greater the potential monopoly profits, and the stronger
the incentive to collude.3 4 If non-members of the association can eas-
ily expand output in response to a curtailment by the members, and
assuming that consumers are adequately informed about fees, the
members will not be able to raise price. Consumers will simply
switch to non-members if members raise price. In effect, the mem-
bers will face a horizontal demand curve at the competitive price.
This requisite market power in the association also implies that
members cannot inexpensively leave the association to escape the
ethical rule fixing price and compete against remaining members.
Adherence to a set of ethical restrictions may be mandated by
law. This might be accomplished by a legal requirement that all pro-
fessionals belong to a particular association, which then imposes a
code of ethics on its members. For example, in states with integrated
bars, attorneys must belong to the state bar association in order to
practice law. The bar has its own set of ethical restrictions, and there
are no competing non-members.
Alternatively, a private association may convince a government to
impose, legislatively or administratively, a set of restrictions as a
condition for offering professional services. For instance, a society of
accountants may persuade a state board of accountancy to prescribe
a set of restrictions for all accountants in the state. In effect, the
association persuades the government authority to adopt its code of
ethics as the standard for the industry; professionals gain no compet-
itive advantage in refusing to join, or by dropping out of the
association. 5
example, if consumers are indifferent between financial planning offered by tax attorneys
and that offered by tax accountants, the lawyers will have no market power even if all
attorneys must belong to the bar association. One could view the two professions as pro-
viding the same service, with non-members (accountants) competing with members (law-
yers). Or one could view the services as distinct but interchangeable. With respect to
professional services, a particular service often can be provided only by members of a
single profession, and so it is usually more comfortable to use the concept of a single
service offered by members or non-members of the association in conducting antitrust
analysis.
34. See, e.g., D. CARLTON & J. PERLOFF, supra note 29, at 217.
35. This paper is concerned with theories of economic harm and benefit of ethical
restrictions and the antitrust treatment that would therefore be appropriate. It does not
focus on the application of legal doctrines that are based essentially on non-economic
considerations. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine would most likely insulate a society from
antitrust liability for persuading a government entity to adopt anticompetitive regula-
tions. See Eastern R.R. Pres. Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961);
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). See generally 1 P. AREEDA
& D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW % 201-04 (1978). The state action doctrine could well
Membership in an association can also be an economic necessity.38
It may reduce the costs of providing professional services so that
non-members cannot compete. This is the classic, though disputed,
"essential facilities" doctrine.3 For instance, suppose participation in
a multiple listing service reduces the cost of facilitating real estate
sales, so that non-participants cannot economically offer brokerage
services. As long as the group did not set a price so high that non-
members could survive in the market, a real estate broker would
have to join the multiple listing service and adhere to its set of
rules.38
Even if a professional association has market power, or has in-
duced a government entity to ratify its ethical rules, the standard
cartel explanation for ethical restrictions may be problematic. First,
prices for heterogeneous services cannot easily be set by a cartel, and
professional services are often heterogeneous.3 9 As the number of
variables in the value of a service increases, the process of fixing
prices and of policing a cartel agreement become increasingly com-
plex. The members cannot be capable of competing away the availa-
ble profits on unrestricted dimensions of the service that make the
service more valuable to consumers. If this theory applies, one would
expect to see explicit price restrictions only on services that are fairly
protect the association from complying with the rules imposed. See supra note 2. This
paper addresses only in passing the appropriate application of those doctrines.
36. Of course, an association with neither legal clout nor economic power can
nonetheless declare that its mandates must be observed by the profession. The American
Chiropractic Association, in its 1971 Code of Ethics, proclaimed, "The honor and dignity
of the chiropractic profession may best be upheld, its sphere of influence expanded, and
its science advanced through the association of all chiropractors in state and national
organizations. Hence it is the duty of each chiropractor to associate himself with such
bodies." See J. CLAPP. supra note 18, at 160.
37. The doctrine typically is traced back to United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n,
224 U.S. 383 (1912) (railroads that owned access to'the only means of crossing the
Mississippi River at St. Louis were required to allow competing railroads to become joint
owners). It has been applied subsequently to cooperation among news gatherers (Associ-
ated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)), among stockbrokers (Silver v. New
York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963)), and, though the Court explicitly disclaimed
reliance on it, between operators of ski lifts (Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Ski-
ing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985)). The doctrine has recently been challenged in Reiffen &
Kleit, Terminal Railroad Revisited: Foreclosure of an Essential Facility or Simple Hor-
izontal Monopoly?, 33 J. L. & EcoN. 419 (1990).
38. To distinguish clearly the cartel anticompetitive theory discussed in this sub-
section from the theories discussed later, the reduction in cost brought about by member-
ship must be unrelated to the ethical restriction at issue. For example, if the efficiencies
offered by a multiple listing service do not require that participants set brokerage fees, a
fee-setting agreement could be condemned without any loss in static efficiency. See infra
note 95. If the restriction under investigation itself reduces cost, then it will not be an-
ticompetitive. Theories of anticompetitive harm, described later, postulate that the re-
striction increases cost and thereby reduces economic welfare.
39. See, e.g., R. POSNER. ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 59-60(1976); D. CARLTON & J. PERLOFF, supra note 29, at 221-22; F. SCHERER & D. Ross,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 279-82 (3rd ed. 1990).
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homogenous and invariant to quality. Indeed, the restrictions on at-
torneys' fees in Goldfarb apparently applied only to rather mundane
activities, such as title searches.4 0
Second, the number of suppliers of professional services in a geo-
graphic market is likely to be quite large. As the number of suppliers
increases, the costs of coordination and policing also increase.4 1 Any
restraint that increases price above marginal cost invites cheating.
Depending on the legal and economic setting involved, the ease of
detecting and determining cheating will vary. At the extreme, expul-
sion from an association may mean expulsion from the profession.
However, even if expulsion is used as the ultimate sanction, the
transgression first has to be discovered. A professional is not likely to
risk expulsion cavalierly, yet chiseling on the price of professional
services is not intrinsically apt to be discovered.
Even if an association with market power can raise prices for some
services above marginal cost and keep cheating to tolerable levels at
an acceptable cost, the association will still have to expect to profit
from the endeavor before the members will engage in it. If the re-
striction generates economic rents, it will attract entry. That entry
will dissipate what otherwise would have been monopoly profits.
This forecast poses the following question: Why would a group of
suppliers agree to a restriction that will reduce output but will not
generate rents? The answer usually offered is that entry will not be
immediate, and so the restriction can generate rents in the interim,
or transitional rents. Assuming that competition from rivals charging
lower prices can be prevented, the restriction is retained even after
entry has eliminated the rents, for if the restriction were dropped,
suppliers would incur the costs of excess capacity, and some would
be squeezed out of the market. Of course, if the members of the
association are unwilling to rescind a restriction due to the costs they
might incur, they will need to be confident that they can maintain
the restriction before imposing it in the first place. If the market
power of the group or the efficacy of the restriction depends upon
government action, which will never be wholly within the control of
the association's members, significant uncertainty about continuing
government support will make them hesitant to adopt the restraint.
In other words, the diminishing stream of expected transitional rents,
40. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 776 (fee schedules provided recommended minimum
prices for common legal services).
41. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 39, at 55-56; D. CARLTON & J. PERLOFF,
supra note 29, at 220-21; F. SCHERER & D. Ross, supra note 39, at 277-79.
discounted to present value, will have to exceed the discounted ex-
pected costs.
Perhaps because the characteristics of most professional markets
are not conducive to cartel pricing, few association codes have been
found with explicit restrictions on price or output. A code might ad-
monish members to charge customary fees, and an association could
have some ancillary method of announcing specific prices and a pol-
icy of enforcing strict adherence to them. In addition, restrictions
that do not explicitly set price or output could conceivably result in
the cartel solution. The restrictions could also facilitate a cartel
agreement that is not embodied in the code. It would be surprising to
find explicit price restrictions in formal ethical codes after Gold-
farb42 and National Association of Real Estate Boards.4 3 In Gold-farb, the Supreme Court held that price fixing by professionals who
are not immunized by state action violates the antitrust laws. How-
ever, given the difficulties inherent in setting prices and policing the
agreement, a professional rule would have to be plain and specific to
function as a cartel device. Broad directives to charge prices that
cover costs,44 or that take into account the prices of competitors, 45
are likely to be mere exercises in wishful thinking. Whether ex-
pressed in imperative or encouraging language, they have, and are
ruefully expected to have, no market impact.46
42. See supra note 31.
43. See supra note 32.
44. See, e.g., the 1922 Code of Ethics of the American Pharmaceutical Associa-
tion, reported in E. HEERMANCE, supra note 18, at 421 (fees "should take into account
the time consumed and the great responsibility involved as well as the cost of the ingredi-
ents"); the 1923 Code of the Photographers' Association of America, id. at 432 ("we
cannot reasonably be giving true service unless we know what it costs us to sell and
unless we sell at a price which will give us a return proportionate to our skill and to our
expense"); the 1891 Code of the United Typothetae of America, id. at 439 ("we should
never forget that there must be as surely levied on each particular job as its labor cost").
45. See, e.g., the 1971 Code of Ethics of the National Society of Professional Engi-
neers, reported in J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at 255 (the engineer "will not undertake work
at a fee or salary below the accepted standards of the profession in the area"); the 1963
Ethical Standards of the American Psychological Association, id. at 631 (in establishing
rates, "the psychologist considers carefully ... the charges made by other professional
persons engaged in comparable work"); the 1972 Ethical Standards of the American
Personnel and Guidance Association, id. at 206 (in establishing fees, the member "shall.
.. take careful account of the charges made for comparable services by other professional
persons"). In its 1904 Code, the American Osteopathic Association stated that local
groups of doctors should fix prices: "Some general rules should be adopted by the physi-
cians in every town or district relative to the minimum pecuniary acknowledgment from
their patients; and it should be deemed a point of honor to adhere to these rules with as
much uniformity as varying circumstances will admit." E. HEERMANCE, supra note 18, at
354. Such an admonition is no more likely to have an anticompetitive effect than the
examples above.
46. Another kind of rule that is the equivalent of an exhortation to charge high
prices is one that enjoins members to charge fair, just, or reasonable prices. For example,
the 1959 Code of Ethics of the American Congress on Surveying and Mapping provided,
"It shall be considered unprofessional ... [t]o attempt to obtain or render technical
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Although the act of setting prices above marginal cost while de-
mand remains constant, cannot be dismissed as an impossible expla-
nation for ethical restrictions, it is not an especially promising the-
ory. It cannot explain the bulk of common ethical restraints.
Consequently, economists have offered other anticompetitive expla-
nations, the most prominent of which follow.
B. Increasing Consumers' Search Costs
Perfect competition requires a large number of sellers and perfect
information on the part of buyers.4 If a seller raised price above the
market level, all buyers who would otherwise have purchased from
the seller would immediately switch to another supplier because they
know that a lower price is available elsewhere. Because the would-be
price raiser's output, even at the competitive price, constitutes an
insignificant proportion of total industry output, the other sellers
would easily be able to absorb the additional sales volume without
experiencing an increase in costs. Therefore, no single supplier has
power to affect price. This situation is illustrated in Figure 2(a).
From the standpoint of any firm, the demand curve is a horizontal
line at pc. The firm can supply as much product as it wants at that
price, but will not sell any product above that price. It will set output
where its marginal cost intersects with demand, at qc.
services or assistance without fair and just compensation commensurate with the services
rendered." See J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at 747-48.
47. For general discussions of the assumptions underlying perfect competition, see






Suppose, however, that consumers do not have a costless supply of
price information. They cannot immediately switch away from the
deviant firm because they do not know where a lower-price seller can
be found. They would have to search one out, and that search is
costly.4 A firm can set price above its marginal cost, secure in the
knowledge that its customers will not be economically able to switch
to an alternative seller.49 If all buyers incur the same significant
search costs, the market will move toward a single price equilibrium
at the monopoly level.50
However, consumers of professional services are not likely to have
identical search costs, no matter what sellers might do to increase
them. The main cost incurred in the search for the lowest price for
professional services is likely to be time, which consumers value dif-
ferently. Thus if search cost is viewed as an opportunity cost, the
48. For an excellent discussion of the effects of imperfect information in markets,
see D. CARLTON & J. PERLOFF, supra note 29, at 554-88. For a more technical presenta-
tion, see L. PHLipS, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION (1988). An interesting
article written for lawyers that applies the economics of information to the enforcement
of contracts is Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979).
49. The information deficiency necessary to permit suppliers to raise price need not
be complete. Consumers may know the initial distribution of prices in a market, but if
they do not know which firm charges which price, and must incur costs to find that out,
they may pay a price that they know exceeds the average. Consequently, prices in the
market will gravitate toward the monopoly level.
50. See Scitovsky, Ignorance as a Source of Oligopoly Power, 40 Am. ECON. RV.
48 (1950); Diamond, A Model of Price Adjustment, 3 J. EcoN. THEORY 156 (1971). For
surveys of the relevant literature, see Salop, Information and Monopolistic Competition,
66 AM. ECON. REV. 240 (1976); Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Product Markets with Imper-
fect Information, 69 AM. ECON. REv. 339 (1979).
[VOL 28: 301, 1991] Antitrust
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
amount of time spent searching will result in different costs to differ-
ent consumers, depending on the alternative uses of their time. For
example, if price advertising for televisions were suddenly elimi-
nated, consumers would be forced to spend more time searching, or
shopping, for the best price. However, that shopping would impose
higher costs on some consumers than on others.5
When a market consists of some informed consumers (those with
low search costs) and some uninformed consumers (those with high
search costs), it may nevertheless produce a single price equilibrium
at marginal cost, which is the outcome of perfect competition.5 2 For
instance, if a seller raised price, the seller could continue to sell to all
of the uninformed consumers that happened to come into the busi-
ness, but would lose all informed consumers. If the proportion of un-
informed consumers is sufficiently small, the seller will not find it
profitable to sell only to uninformed buyers.
However, if the proportion of uninformed consumers is large, a
market may result in which some suppliers charge prices above mar-
ginal cost and others charge prices at marginal cost. Depending on
the severity of the assumptions, the market may produce a two price
equilibrium, one price at marginal cost and the other at the monop-
oly level, or an array of prices. 3 For example, the hypothetical seller
may raise prices and lose all informed buyers, but still profit by
charging the monopoly price to its share of uninformed buyers. An-
other firm may find it profitable to charge a lower price and capture
informed consumers, as well as its share of uninformed consumers.
Just how large the proportion of informed consumers in the mar-
ket must be in order to produce the results of perfect competition,
depends on the shape of the average total cost curves of the firms in
the industry and the amount above marginal cost that consumers are
willing to pay.54 As fixed costs in an industry decrease, the propor-
51. Indeed, increasing the time spent searching can impose negative costs on a
consumer. Searching for a better price is another way to describe shopping, and consum-
ers may derive positive utility from the act of shopping. However, shopping for bargains
in professional services is not likely to be a popular pastime.
52. For a non-technical explanation of this result, see D. CARLTON & J. PERLOFF,
supra note 29, at 573-74.
53. See generally Butters, Equilibrium Distribution of Sales and Advertising
Prices, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 465 (1977); Rothschild, Models of Market Organization
with Imperfect Information" A Survey, 82 J. POL. ECON. 1283 (1974); Stigler, The Eco-
nomics of Information, 69 J. POL ECON. 213 (1961); Salop & Stiglitz, Bargains and
Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion, 44 REV. ECON.
STUD. 493 (1977).
54. See D. CARLTON & J. PERLOFF, supra note 29, at 574.
tion of informed consumers necessary to produce a market price at
marginal cost increases. This is because less revenue is needed to
cover total costs when fixed costs decrease; a firm may find it profita-
ble to do a small volume of business with uninformed buyers. As the
price that consumers are willing to pay rises above marginal cost, the
profit is greater on each sale, and the minimum profitable sales vol-
ume is lower. Thus, as the demand curve net of search costs becomes
more steeply sloped, a greater proportion of informed consumers is
needed to produce the competitive result.
The effect of changing a market from one in which all consumers
have perfect information to one in which some consumers are unin-
formed is to change the residual demand curve facing each firm
from a horizontal line to a downward sloping one. Depending on the
slope of the demand curve and its average total cost curve, a firm
may be able to set price above marginal cost and earn economic
rents. However, if entry into the market by qualified suppliers is un-
limited, the rents will attract entry. As new firms enter, the residual
demand curve facing each firm will shift to the left until no firm is
earning profits.5 5 This, in essence, is a model of monopolistic
competition. 6
The process is illustrated in Figure 2(b). When all consumers are
perfectly informed, the seller faces the horizontal demand curve in
Figure 2(a). If the market suddenly changes so that a large propor-
tion of consumers are uninformed, the demand curve facing the firm
becomes downward sloping, taking the shape D1 in Figure 2(b).
Now the firm equates marginal cost with the new marginal revenue
curve associated with the new demand, MR1. The firm raises price
to pl, sells q, units, and earns profits represented by rectangle
pjABC. The profits are the difference between total revenue, mea-
sured by price times output, and total costs, measured by average
total cost times output. These profits attract new firms, and as they
enter, the residual demand curve facing the firm shifts to the left.
Eventually, demand shifts to D2, where it is tangent to the average
total cost curve, generating the new marginal revenue curve MR 2.
The firm now equates marginal cost and marginal revenue, sets price
at P2, sells q2 units, and earns zero profits.
55. If some firms in the market find it profitable to charge a low price in order to
capture informed consumers, entry will force that price down to marginal cost and dissi-
pate any profits.
56. See Salop, Information and Monopolistic Competition, supra note 52; D.
CARLTON & J. PERLOFF, supra note 29, at 570-71, 313-32.
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Several implications of this model should be emphasized. First, the
event that increases search costs does not have to affect the costs
borne by the firms. Their costs could increase or decrease, but the
model depends on a change in demand, not a change in the costs of
the supplies. Further, the model does not require increasing marginal
costs. A market in which all firms have the same constant marginal
costs can produce the same result, so long as firms have some fixed
costs.
The welfare effects of monopolistic competition, though generally
ambiguous, are typically negative.5 7 Where the industry supplies an
undifferentiated, or homogenous product, welfare is reduced because
price exceeds marginal cost. If marginal costs are constant, the econ-
omy will incur excessive fixed costs. That is, the number of firms will
be supra-optimal. Where the industry supplies differentiated prod-
ucts, price again exceeds marginal cost, but the industry may pro-
duce too much or too little variety. There may be too many or too
few firms.
If an association of professionals can effectuate a restraint that
increases consumer search costs, its members may profit, at least in
57. See generally D. CARLTON & J. PERLOFF, supra note 29, at 326-42.
the short-run, and economic welfare may suffer. For example, sup-
pose professionals at one time engage in extensive price advertising,
and consumers are consequently fully informed about price at no
cost to themselves.58 The association then manages to suppress price
advertising, so consumers are forced to seek out low-price suppliers
through various search activities, perhaps by telephoning various
providers. Sonfe consumers will find these search activities prohibi-
tively costly, and will be content to pay any price up to their reserva-
tion prices for the service.59 If enough consumers react this way,
each professional may be able to profitably raise the price above
marginal cost.
Although the result is the same as in the previously discussed car-
tel model, this model does not require any agreement on price among
the suppliers. However, like the previous model, it implicitly requires
that the members of the association have the power, collectively to
affect price, thereby increasing consumer search costs. For example,
if a single professional refused to advertise price, consumers would
simply patronize those professionals who advertise. The association
would have to account for a large percentage of the professionals in
the market, though perhaps not as large of a percentage as is re-
quired to raise price by limiting output, and this implies a legal or
economic requirement of membership. Further, the association
would have to enforce the restriction among its members. Again, like
the cartel model, the search cost theory is only plausible if the ex-
pected short run profits earned before entry exceed any expected
losses.
In both the cartel and search cost models, suppliers profit by
charging a price in excess of marginal cost, and market price exceeds
the industry marginal cost at the output supplied. In the cartel
model, the association produces the result by restricting the prices
offered, a process that affects neither the shape of the demand curve
58. This analysis assumes that search costs decrease as the volume of costless in-
formation increases. In fact, to be perfectly informed, consumers must mentally process
the raw information received, and this process, because it takes time, imposes costs. As a
result, more information can theoretically make consumers less well informed. A study of
physician services concluded that an increase in the number of providers resulted in an
increase in consumer search costs and an increase in average prices. Pauly & Satter-
thwaite, The Pricing of Primary Care Physicians' Services: A Test of the Role of Con-
sumer Information, 12 BELL J. ECON. 488 (1981).
59. The posited increase in consumer search costs brought about by the elimination
of price advertising assumes that an equal amount and quality of information is not
available to consumers at no cost from other sources. If professionals convey the same
price information through activities other than price advertising, a ban on advertising
will have no effect on search costs. The ban would have to extend to those other activi-
ties. When professionals incur different costs in engaging in different information dissem-
ination activities, a ban on any one activity may have anticompetitive effects. This is the
subject of the theories discussed in the following sub-sections, especially "Raising the
Marginal Costs of All Suppliers."
[VOL. 28: 301. 1991] Antitrust
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
nor the shape of the supply curve. In the search cost model, the asso-
ciation generates the result by a restraint that affects the shape of
the demand curve, but does not necessarily affect the shape of the
supply curve. 0 In the following two models, anticompetitive effects
are predicted to result from restraints that affect the shape of the
supply curve but not necessarily that of the demand curve. What's
more, neither depends on a market price that exceeds marginal cost.
C: Increasing the Marginal Costs of Marginal Suppliers
The recent literature on "raising rivals' costs" has achieved notori-
ety principally as a theory of anticompetitive harm flowing from ver-
tical transactions. Associated primarily with Steven Salop, David
Scheffman, and Thomas Krattenmaker, the theory postulates that a
firm in a competitive output market can profitably raise the marginal
costs of its rivals by restricting the supply of a vital input and
thereby increase output pricey.6 The firm incurs a fixed cost in secur-
ing the restriction, for example, by paying input suppliers not to sell
to its rivals. The reduced input supply forces up the price of the
remaining input available to the predator's rivals, which increases
the rivals' marginal costs. This increase in the disadvantaged firms'
marginal costs causes the industry supply curve in the output market
to rotate in a counterclockwise direction from its origin. Market
price is still set at the intersection of supply and demand, but now
price is higher and output is lower. Thus, economic welfare is re-
duced. But the economic rents captured by producers can increase,
depending on the elasticities of demand and supply, and so the
predator profits, and in some circumstances, even the predator's
competitors gain.
The raising rivals' costs approach to antitrust analysis is open to
serious objection. Some critics charge that it fails to identify an-
ticompetitive practices that would escape condemnation under con-
60. Both of these models predict inefficiently great entry, and that will increase
fixed costs in the industry. But fixed costs are not reflected in the short-run industry
supply curves.
61. The "raising rivals' costs" analysis has evolved through a number of articles.
See Salop & Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AMER. ECON. REV. 267 (1983); Krat-
tenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:, supra note 4. Krattenmaker & Salop,
Competition and Cooperation in the Market for Exclusionary Rights, 76 AMER. EcON.
REV. 109 (1986); Krattenmaker & Salop, Analyzing Anticompetitive Exclusion, 56 AN-
TITRUST L. J. 71 (1987); Salop & Scheffman, Cost Raising Strategies, 36 J. INDUS.
ECON. 19 (1987); Ordover, Saloner, & Salop, Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80
AMER. ECON. REv. 127 (1990). The simplest introduction to the analysis is Krattenmaker
& Salop, Exclusion and Antitrust, I1 REG. 34 (1987).
323
ventional analysis, such as monopolization under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.62 Others focus on the stringent economic conditions
necessary for the analysis to make sense, and argue that the ap-
proach has no practical utility and is unable to distinguish between
efficient and anticomnpetitive practices. 63 For example, a predator will
not typically be able to purchase effective monopoly power in an out-
put market from an input supplier at a profitable price because the
supplier would often be able to extract any profits available, and dis-
advantaged rivals would be induced to take countermeasures. Critics
also contend that the approach perversely provides firms with an an-
alytical tool for challenging the efficient competitive practices of
their rivals.6 4
Raising rivals' costs theory may have more to offer to the study of
horizontal arrangements. Suppose some group of professionals is able
to secure, at a fixed cost, a restriction on certain activities that has
the effect of increasing their competitors' marginal costs, but not
their own. For example, suppose one group of dentists does not use
dental hygienists, but another does. Use of the hygienists tends to
flatten the marginal cost curves of the dentists who employ them. If
the dentists who eschew the auxiliaries can manage to ban their use,
those dentists will not experience an increase in marginal costs while
competing dentists will. The industry supply curve rotates up and to
the left, market price rises, and the dentists who secured the ban
gain, so long as the fixed costs they incurred are less than the addi-
tional rents.
The effects of this scenario are illustrated in Figure 3. With use of
hygienists, the supply curve for dental services is S1. The market
price is Pl, output ql, and the profession earns rents represented by
triangle pICA. When the ban is imposed, the supply curve rotates up
to S2. Price increases to P2, quantity drops to q2, and rents are re-
flected by triangle p2BA. Rents are greater, as p2BA is larger than
p1CA. Total welfare drops by the area of triangles BCE and BEA,
as well as by the amount of the fixed cost incurred. And notice that
62. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). See, e.g., Brennan, Understanding "Raising Rivals'
Costs," 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 95 (1986); Liebeler, Exclusion and Efficiency, 11 REo. 34
(1987).
63. See, e.g., Boudreaux, Turning Back the Antitrust Clock: Nonprice Predation
in Theory and Practice, REG., Fall, 1990, at 45; Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Deci-
sionmaking Tasks, 76 GEo. L.J. 305, 314-16 (1987); Lopatka & Godek, Another Look
at ALCOA: Raising Rivals' Costs Does Not Improve the View, J.L. & Econ. (in press);
Claims of Predation in a Competitive Marketplace: When is an Antitrust Response Ap-
propriate?, Remarks of Charles F. Rule, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
before the 1988 Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association (Aug. 9, 1988); Coate
& Kleit, Exclusion, Collusion, and Confusion: The Limits of Raising Rivals' Costs,
Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission Working Paper No. 179 (Oct. 1990).
* 64. See, e.g., ANTITRUST IN NEW ZEALAND: THE CASE FOR REFORM 36 (New
Zealand Business Roundtable Sept. 1988).
[VOL. 28: 301, 1991] Antitrust
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
the welfare loss occurs with no change in the demand curve.
FIGURE 3
A discussion of many of the implications of this theory will be
saved for the next subsection, which explains a model based on this
theory, but one that arguably applies more broadly. For now, two
points should be stressed. First, for this theory to work, the output
industry supply curve must be upward sloping, at least after the re-
straint is imposed. Technically, the restraint must make the supply
curve more steeply sloped than it would otherwise be. Restraints that
prevent a supply curve from becoming flatter, or rotating down and
to the right, are as objectionable as those that force the curve to
rotate up and to the left. If supply is and remains infinitely elastic,
any costs imposed on existing providers will have no impact on price
and, therefore, will not generate rents. This also implies that if unre-
strained suppliers can quickly expand or enter the market, the re-
straint on disadvantaged rivals will generate little profit.
The second point is related to the first. The firms seeking the re-
straint must have the power to affect marginal costs and thereby af-
fect price. The association may consist solely of practitioners whose
marginal costs would not be affected by the restraint. In that case,
the association would have to possess the legal clout to impose the
restraint on non-members, perhaps by securing the assistance of a
government agency. If the association has no legal power, then it can
only impose the restraint on its members. Membership in the associ-
ation would need to bestow some significant economic benefit. More-
over, the faction in the association that does not engage in the prac-
tice it seeks to restrict may have to defeat a faction that does engage
in the practice. This is by no means impossible, but it may be diffi-
cult, or costly.
D. Raising the Marginal Costs of All Suppliers
Extending raising rivals' costs theory, James Langenfeld and John
Morris incorporate the insight of Richard Nelson, 5 and demonstrate
that the profits of a group of identical professionals can increase
when each professional incurs the same cost increase.66 Firms can
thus increase profits by raising their own costs. This refinement elim-
inates the need to explain how a group of professionals in an associa-
tion could have the inclination and power to disadvantage competing
professionals in the same association - the theory does not depend
upon factions of a group using the group's machinery to injure other
factions of the same group.
To understand this model, recall first that an industry supply
curve represents the horizontal summation of that part of each firm's
marginal cost curve that lies above its average variable cost curve. In
the short run, though not necessarily the long run, the industry sup-
ply curve is likely to be upward sloping. That is, in a particular finite
period, some costs are fixed. Given that fixed cost constraint, margi-
nal costs are likely to increase after some output as volume grows.
The profits earned during that period are, consequently, short-run
profits, or quasi-rents. An industry has an incentive to maximize
short-run profits.
Langenfeld and Morris identify two components of marginal cost:
variable cost and incremental cost. In their terminology, a change in
variable costs causes a uniform shift in the supply curve; a change in
incremental costs causes the supply curve to rotate and thereby
change the slope of the supply curve.6 The intuition behind this dis-
65. Nelson, Increased Rents from Increased Costs: A Paradox of Value Theory,
65 J. POL. EcON. 387 (1957).
66. Langenfeld & Morris, Rent Increasing Costs, supra note 16, at 2; Langenfeld
& Morris, Analyzing Agreements, supra note 16. Whether this refinement was over-
looked in the earlier raising rivals' costs literature is not entirely clear. The original pro-
ponents seemed to recognize that, at least in some vertical contexts, a predator could
benefit even when its own marginal costs increased. See Krattenmaker & Salop, An-
ticompetitive Exclusion, supra note 4, at 238. Krattenmaker & Salop argue that when a
predator overbuys an input, the resulting higher price is paid by the predator and its
rivals. But "if marginal costs rise faster tharq average costs, the resulting price increase
could benefit all the firms."
67. Langenfeld & Morris, Rent Increasing Costs, supra note 16, at 5.
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tinction is that sometimes a firm's costs increase as output expands,
so costs are not fixed, and they increase the same amount for each
indivisible unit of output in the relevant range of production. A rise
in these costs causes the industry supply curve to rise above and re-
main parallel to the previous supply curve. During other times, costs
can increase as output grows. This increase would be reflected in a
counterclockwise rotation of the supply curve.
If variable costs rise needlessly, a deadweight social welfare loss
will result, as will a loss in productive efficiency. However, the short-
run profits of the producers will also decline. This is illustrated in
Figure 4. As an increase in variable costs pushes the supply curve up
frorh S1 to S2, price increases from p, to P2, and output declines
from ql to q2. Welfare declines, and quasi-rents also decrease, from
the area in triangle pBF to the area in the smaller triangle p2AE.
Even though a restraint that increased variable costs would reduce
welfare, the possibility of such a restraint can be discounted because
the producers would have no incentive to effectuate it.
FIGURE 4
S2





An increase in incremental costs is illustrated in Figure 3. The
effects on welfare and profits are identical to those described for an
anticompetitive increase in rivals' costs. Like that model, this model
assumes no change in demand. An increase in incremental costs
reduces welfare. However, because it can also increase quasi-rents,
depending upon the relevant elasticities of demand and supply, firms
may have an incentive to take actions that produce the result. Those
actions cannot be ignored.
Langenfeld and Morris use a restriction on advertising, to illus-
trate a restraint that increases consumer search costs, as an example
of a restraint that increases incremental costs.68 Suppose that in or-
der to sell a small amount of its services a firm of professionals need
incur no advertising costs. It opens its doors, turns on the lights, and
a certain number of clients just walk in. However, to attract addi-
tional clients, the firm begins to advertise. A small amount of adver-
tising will attract a few new clients, but to attract more clients, the
firm has to engage in more and more advertising, at higher and
higher costs. For simplicity, assume that this is the only marginal
cost the firm incurs, and so its marginal cost curve slopes upward.
Now imagine that the firm is precluded from advertising. The re-
straint has no effect on its costs of acquiring the first few clients, for
it was always able to attract those without advertising. But to attract
additional clients, the firm now has to substitute some other activity.
The activity can be expected to be less efficient, or more costly than
advertising, otherwise the firm would have used that method instead
of advertising at the outset. Thus, for any given output greater than
the initial increment, the firm's marginal cost is higher than it was
before the restraint. The firm's marginal cost curve therefore be-
comes less elastic. Because the model assumes that every firm is
identical and incurs the same cost increase, the industry supply curve
rotates up and to the left.
The additional rents attract new firms into the industry. As they
enter, according to Langenfeld and Morris, the supply curve flattens
out, rotating back toward, but not to, its original position. 69 Entry
continues until each firm's profits decline to a normal level. This may
prompt another round of actions that increase incremental costs, fol-
lowed by entry. Eventually, the market reaches a new equilibrium, at
which suppliers are earning zero profits and so no entry would occur.
However, now each firm has artificially high incremental costs, due
to the restraint, and produces less than it would produce in a market
68. See Langenfeld & Morris, Rent Increasing Costs, supra note 16, at 16. Other
restraints might have a similar effect. For example, restrictions on the use of tradenames,
on operating multiple offices, on the permissible location of offices, or on employment by
nonprofessionals could be explained as an attempt to increase the incremental costs of
supply. See also the 1923 code of the American Institute of Accountants, reported in E.
HEERMANCE, supra note 18, at 5 ("No member or associate shall allow any person to
practice in his name as a public accountant who is not a member or associate of the
institute or in partnership with him or in his employ on a salary").
69. If all new firms enter the market burdened by the same restraint that increased
the incremental costs of incumbents, it is not clear that entry would cause a clockwise
rotation of the short run industry supply curve, or that it would cause any change in the
slope of that curve. One would expect, however, that entry would dissipate profits and
that the long run equilibrium price in the market would be higher than it otherwise
would have been because the firms will be using fixed assets less efficiently.
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absent the restraint. The firms agree to the restraint despite the ex-
pected entry because of the transitional rents, and they refuse to re-
scind it to avoid the losses that freeing the now excessive number of
firms from the restraint would impose. A sudden elimination of the
restriction would drive the supply curve below S1 in Figure 3, and
some firms would be forced out of the market.
The first implication to note about this example, and therefore the
model, is that eliminating advertising, by itself, reduces costs - ad-
vertising is rarely free. Incremental costs increase because some
other activity is substituted. If some unrestricted activity is a close
economic substitute for advertising, an advertising ban will not in-
crease marginal costs significantly. So if firms are indifferent be-
tween advertising and direct mail solicitation, a ban on advertising
alone will have no impact on marginal costs. To have an effect, the
restraint has to encompass all good substitutes. At the extreme,
where all possible substitutes are precluded, the supply curve would
become perfectly inelastic, a vertical line, after some increment of
volume.
This recognition leads naturally to a comparison of this model and
the theory of increasing consumers' search costs. The Langenfeld
and Morris explanation assumes that a restriction on advertising im-
poses on producers the costs of more expensive promotional activi-
ties. The search cost model assumes that an advertising ban forces
consumers to incur the costs of more expensive, substitute methods
of search. The best way to view the matter may be to recognize a
demand for information. That demand can be met by suppliers act-
ing to convey information, consumers acting to acquire information,
or both. Indeed, consumers typically obtain information as a result
of their own efforts as well as those of suppliers. Therefore, an adver-
tising restriction may have little effect on suppliers' marginal costs
even if those suppliers have no good alternatives.
Suppose, for example, consumers can acquire information in three
ways: suppliers can advertise, suppliers can distribute handbills, and
consumers can phone suppliers. Suppose also that advertising is the
most efficient way of performing the economic function of imparting
information; handbills are a terrible substitute, but telephone inquiry
imposes only slightly more social costs than advertising. If an associ-
ation prohibited advertising, its members would not distribute hand-
bills, and their marginal costs would not increase at relevant levels of
output. Consumers would start calling.
Referring to Figure 3, assume that S, and D represent the supply
and demand curves when suppliers advertise. Suppliers then stop ad-
vertising, and consumers begin phoning. The demand curve would
then drop down slightly or rotate slightly, down and to the left. It
would intersect S, to the left of C. The supply curve would not ro-
tate up - indeed, it might rotate down. At least there would be no
change in its slope through ql. This means that, at least for all quan-
tities that can continue to be economically supplied, marginal costs
are no higher. There is nevertheless a small welfare loss as well as a
small reduction in quasi-rents. Therefore, for a restriction on infor-
mation dissemination activities to reduce welfare significantly and
generate profits, the restriction must encompass all close substitutes
for suppliers. Further, consumers must not have close substitutes for
acquiring information.
In addition to the requirement that there be no good substitute for
the restrained activity, the costs associated with the economic func-
tion performed must represent a significant proportion of total mar-
ginal costs. This condition applies equally to the raising rivals' costs
model. Suppose that demand is satisfied at an output of around 100
units, and an advertising ban increases marginal costs by about
$5.00. If, at that output, the firm's marginal costs are $10,000, the
increase in cost is trivial, .05%. A trivial increase in incremental
costs will produce a trivial change in the supply curve. If instead,
total marginal costs increase from $10.00 to $15.00, the effect on the
supply curve is dramatic.70 Therefore, an advertising ban may have a
very different effect on the supply of tooth extractions than it has on
the supply of neurosurgery.
Another implication of this model is that the association must
have some form of market power, that is, the members of the associ-
ation must be facing a downward sloping demand curve. Further, the
slope of the demand curve must be significant in order for the associ-
ation to have significant power over price. Technically, the increase
in price brought about by the higher costs must occur where demand
is inelastic. Suppose the association faces the demand curve D in
Figure 5. A rotation of the supply curve from S1 to S2 would have no
effect on market price Pc, but would simply reduce the members'
profits. The association could increase profits only by reducing costs,
say from S2 to S1. Even if the demand curve is downward sloping, as
is D, a rotation of the supply curve from S, to S2 would produce a
huge reduction in output, from q, to q2, but only a slight increase in
price, from P, to P2. The cost increase would reduce profits.
70. Krattenmaker and Salop have recognized that the effect of raising rivals' costs
of an input on market price and resulting quasi-rents depends on "both the size of the
increase and the magnitude of the particular factor of production in the firms' overall
costs of doing business." Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion, supra note
4, at 259.
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The sources of an association's market power have been discussed
previously. 1 To recapitulate briefly, the association has to control
any substitutes for its service. If non-members could otherwise pro-
vide the same service, the association may be able to secure govern-
ment action to force non-members to comply with the association's
restraints. If membership is an economic necessity for suppliers in
the market, the association will not need legal support, but it will
have to ensure that its members comply with its rules.
The hypothetical advertising restriction prompts one to ask
whether the consumers' search cost theory or one of the suppliers'
marginal costs theories is more robust. 2 Under both, the restriction
increases price, lowers output, and reduces welfare.73 A restriction
that causes a welfare loss under either theory may be easier to police
than would the kind of restriction necessary under the cartel pricing
theory. The nature of the market power necessary to increase con-
sumers' search costs differs from that required to increase suppliers'
71. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
72. An advertising restriction can be explained under the pure raising rivals' costs
theory, if it has a disparate impact on different suppliers.
73. ' The source and magnitude of the welfare loss is not identical under both mod-
els, however. If consumer search costs are raised, price persists above marginal cost,
causing a loss of allocative efficiency, and entry is likely to be excessive. If producers'
marginal costs are raised, at no increase in fixed costs, price will drop to the pre-restraint
level as entry occurs. Welfare suffers during the interim, when marginal cost is higher
than it has to be, and because of the needless entry of resources the restraint provokes.
costs. The number of firms in a market whose advertising must be
restricted in order to increase search costs may differ from that nec-
essary to change the slope of the supply curve. Still, market power is
a necessary condition under both theories. The observable indicators
of an anticompetitive effect such as restraint, market power, price
increase, output reduction, and profit increase are the same under
both theories. Consequently, the theory a court or antitrust enforcer
uses may not matter much. If the supply cost increase theories are
more useful, the reason may be that some restrictions have a more
apparent impact on supply costs than on search costs.
Finally, under all of the anticompetitive theories, because entry
can occur, the profits are short-lived. How short depends on a num-
ber of entry conditions, but eventually, profits will succumb. The net
benefit of any strategy has to take into account not only the pre-
dicted magnitude and life span of the transitional profits, but also
the size and likelihood of any losses. An association that creates a
restraint through government action runs the risk of losing official
support. Members of an association that manage to procure a re-
straint that disadvantages other members assume the risk that their
adversaries will mount a successful counterattack. Further, an anti-
trust court might ultimately outlaw any anticompetitive restriction.
If the restriction is rescinded for any reason after entry has produced
a new equilibrium, the profession will suffer losses. How the losses
will fall on particular firms is indeterminate, but some firms that had
operated before the restraint may well be worse off after it is re-
scinded. Those potential losses may make firms reluctant to agree to
the restraint in the first place, and make an anticompetitive explana-
tion for an observed restraint less persuasive.
E. Raising the Fixed Costs of New Entrants
Firms in any industry stand to benefit when fixed costs that the
incumbents can and did avoid, are imposed on new entrants. These
costs are Stiglerian. entry barriers.74 They do not immediately or au-
tomatically affect the market price of the service or the profits of the
incumbents. However, they do allow incumbents to raise price above
marginal cost with a measure of impunity. 75 If demand increases for
exogenous reasons, market price and the profits of incumbents will
also increase. Further, the long-run industry supply curve, and hence
market price, will almost certainly rise regardless of changes in de-
mand. The firm will profit while the market is moving to the new,
74. See G. STIGLER, BARRIERS TO ENTRY, ECONOMIES OF SCALE, AND FIRM SIZE,
in the ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968).
75. See generally Salop & Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, supra note 61, at
267; Salop & Scheffman, Cost-Raising Strategies, supra note 61, at 19.
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higher equilibrium price, and for as long thereafter as a firm that
avoided the additional cost can stay in the market.
Suppose a society of barbers, each of whom had completed a six-
week training program, manage to establish a requirement that any
new barber must complete a four-year course of graduate studies.
Suppose also that the new training has no impact on the quality of
haircutting. The education requirement would impose a fixed cost on
new barbers that the incumbent barbers never had to incur. This
kind of requirement is most likely to occur as a result of government
action in the form of a licensing requirement, though it could be
imposed privately if the society has an economic source of market
power. By the time barbers meeting the education qualification com-
pletely displace other barbers in the market, the requirement will no
longer generate profits. But the barbers who established the restraint
will have profited from it, and it will continue to impose needless
social costs. Therefore, there is an anticompetitive explanation for
the action.76
F. Collusively Manipulating Demand
The anticompetitive theories discussed so far involve manipulating'
costs or pricing above marginal cost. Welfare can also be affected by
actions that change demand and do not result in prices above margi-
nal cost. Joint actions that only increase demand are assumed to in-
crease consumer welfare. However, an agreement to disseminate
false information that increases demand could arguably reduce wel-
fare, though welfare could not be calculated simply by objective ref-
erence to demand curves. Further, any normative valuation of de-
mand would be fraught with difficulty. In the context of professional
rules, it is more likely that members of an association might agree to
suppress accurate information, which if learned, would reduce the
76. The anticompetitive explanations discussed in the text involve effects in the
market for professional services. Professionals also function as purchasers of inputs to
provide those services. A professional rule could reduce welfare by restraining purchases
in the input market. In other words, a rule could turn the association into a monopsony
cartel. In such a case, the price paid for the input and the quantity purchased are less
than a competitive buyers' market would produce. For example, employees of profes-
sional firms are likely to be a significant input. Given the right conditions, a rule that
forbids competition among members for employees could have monopsonistic effects. Ba-
sically, the skills of the employee would have to be so specialized that he earns signifi-
cantly more in one job than he would in any other. Further, the parties to the agreement
would need to have market power with respect to that job. For a general discussion of the
necessary conditions for and effects of monopsony, see D. CARLTON & J. PERLOFF, supra
note 29, at 114-17.
demand for professional services. For the same reasons that an
agreement to disseminate false information might reduce welfare, an
agreement to withhold truthful information could arguably also pro-
duce that effect. Conduct that impermissibly results in greater de-
mand than would otherwise exist is usually the subject of consumer
protection laws, such as laws against false advertising." Whether the
objectionable conduct is the product of joint or unilateral action is
largely an economic detail. Consumer protection laws can apply to
both kinds of actions, whereas the antitrust laws typically cannot.
However, in appropriate cases the practice could be analyzed under
the antitrust laws.
For example, suppose an association's rule prohibits members
from disclosing any information that would adversely affect the rep-
utation of another member .7  The information restrained by such a
rule might have no effect on the demand for professional services,
but merely cause a shift in the pattern of supply among profession-
als. Yet the rule might reduce the aggregate amount of negative in-
formation about the profession supplied to consumers, information
that would have caused consumers to lose confidence in a profession,
and consequently caused market demand to drop.79 Such a rule
could also reduce the negative externalities that would flow from an
77. E.g., the Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988), prohibits
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."
78. Rules that prohibit members from disparaging the services of another member
or another professional are commonplace in associations' codes of ethics. See, e.g., the
rules of the following associations: American Dental Association, reprinted in E. HEER-
MANCE, supra note 18, at 143 (1923 version) and in J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at 227
(1972 version); International Secret Service Association, reprinted in E. HEERMANCE,
supra note 18, at 145 (date of version not disclosed); National Association of Real Estate
Boards, reprinted in id. at 452 (1924 version) and the National Association of Realtors,
reprinted in J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at 676 (1962 version); National Funeral Directors
Association of the United States, reprinted in E. HEERMANCE, supra note 18, at 517
(1919 version); National Auctioneers Association, reprinted in J. CLAPP, supra note 18,
at 111 (1949 version); American Association of Marriage and Family Counselors, id. at
432 (1962 version). The potential effect of professional criticism in at least some contexts
was suggested in the 1970 rules of the American Optometric Association: "When an
optometrist succeeds another optometrist in the charge of a case, he should not make
comments on, or insinuations regarding the practice of the one who preceded him. Such
comments or insinuations tend to lower the esteem of the patient for the optometric
profession and so react against the critic." Reprinted in J. CLAPP, id. at 517 (emphasis
added).
79. A rule that prohibits the dissemination of truthful, critical information about a
competitor could be viewed as one that increases the incremental costs of members. See
siipra notes 65-70 and accompanying text. If the least costly way of attracting additional
clients is to inform them that their chosen professionals are somehow inferior, the rule
could force members to substitute more expensive activities to increase output. This ex-
planation is not wholly convincing, however, because the inherent effect of disclosing
negative information is to eliminate the practitioner to whom it relates from the market.
The total elimination of competitors from the market is likely to have a more dramatic
effect on the supply curve, a more favorable effect on the profits of remaining profession-
als, than is a collective decision to increase the incremental costs of all suppliers.
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individual's decision to disclose information that reflects badly on the
profession, but nevertheless lead to an efficiency loss. In practice, de-
termining that such a rule is likely to reduce welfare would be diffi-
cult. Making an economically relevant determination as to whether
information is "true" or "false" could prove intractable. Further, a
rule that restrained the dissemination of only false or misleading in-
formation about a competitor would not even arguably reduce wel-
fare. 0 Indeed, a rule that prevented demand from dropping by re-
straining the dissemination of false information would increase
welfare. 81 Nonetheless, the theoretical possibility of a welfare-reduc-
ing rule of this kind should be acknowledged..
80. Several associations have adopted rules that only prohibit the dissemination of
false or malicious information about competitors. See, e.g., the rules of the following
associations: American Institute of Architects, reprinted in E. HEERMANCE, supra note
18, at 23 (1922 version); American Institute of Consulting Engineers, reported id. at 166
(1921 version); American Society of Civil Engineers, reported id. at 170 (1914 version);
American Society of Appraisers, reprinted in J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at 63 (1968
version).
81. Welfare can also be enhanced by rules that require members to disclose infor-
mation about the incompetence of another professional. See, e.g., the code of the Board
for Certification of Genealogists, reprinted in J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at 323 ("I will...
participate in exposing genealogical charlatans.") (date of version not disclosed); the
code of the American Physical Therapy Association, reported id. at 562 ("The physical
therapist should accept responsibility for exposing incompetence ... to the appropriate
authority") (1969 version).
In some situations, the dissemination of critical, though truthful, information about
competitors could conceivably injure the consumer in a way unrelated to the general
perception of the profession. In such a case, a rule prohibiting disparagement could ar-
guably increase consumer welfare. For example, the American Medical Association code
recognized that telling a patient disparaging information about his or her physician's
treatment could interfere with that treatment to the detriment of the patient. See E.
HEERMANCE, supra note 18, at 343 (1912 version). This rationale was suggested, yet
questioned by an English author:
[O]ne of the cardinal rules [of etiquette for physicians] was to make certain
that the patient knew of no difference of opinion that might arise in consulta-
tion. No doubt that was good for the patient's peace of mind, but was that the
only consideration? "I was dining at the Duke of Richmond's one day last
winter," wrote the physician Thomas Young about 1800, "and there came in
two notes, one from Sir W. Farquhar, and the other from Dr[.] Hunter, in
answer to an inquiry whether or no His Grace might venture to eat fruit pies or
strawberries. I trembled for the honour of the profession, and could not conceal
my apprehensions from the company: luckily, however, they agreed tolerably
well, the only difference of opinion being on the subject of the pie-crust.
W. READER, supra note 14, at 19 (footnote omitted). This efficiency enhancing argument
is founded on paternalism, however. It assumes that consumers can be made worse off by
giving them truthful information. This is a flimsy basis on which to restrain the dissemi-
nation of information.
IV. WELFARE-ENHANCING THEORIES OF PROFESSIONAL RULES
In order for an ethical restraint to be justified as efficiency-en-
hancing, it obviously must produce an increase in economic welfare.
Each of the anticompetitive theories described predicts a loss in total
welfare as well as a loss in consumer welfare. A restraint might in-
crease total welfare at the same time it reduces consumer surplus, if
producer gains outweigh consumer losses. This article assumes that
to constitute an antitrust violation, any class of restraints must first
of all reduce total welfare.82
Moreover, because the ethical rules under review are at least in
part a product of voluntary actions of private suppliers, no welfare-
enhancing theory will be considered plausible unless the restriction
increases the profits of the association. It is conceivable that a group
of altruistic professionals would agree to some restraint that benefits
consumers but reduces their own profits. (Only a very odd group in-
deed would effectuate a restraint that harmed both themselves and
consumers). However, such an altruistic restraint conflicts with fun-
damental assumptions of rational economic behavior, and that kind
of motivation could not explain many restraints in any event.
Slightly more plausible, yet equally devoid of analytical interest, is
the rare restraint that increases consumer welfare but has no effect
on profits.
Finally, some ethical rules affect neither consumer welfare nor
producer surplus. If a small society of veterinarians wanted to admit
only graduates of the University of Illinois, the membership restric-
tion would have no impact on demand or supply in the market for
professional services. Technically, the qualification would presuma-
bly have some positive utility associated with it or the association
82. Many commentators over the years have argued that the antitrust laws have
non-economic underpinnings and that they should promote social and political values.
Other commentators have argued that the antitrust laws serve the economic goal of pro-
tecting consumer welfare, so that a practice that increases total welfare but reduces con-
sumer surplus should violate the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy
After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 213 (1985); Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of
Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 429 (1988). Although these
arguments are not convincing, the restraints identified in this Article as welfare-enhanc-
ing typically would not result in any diminution in consumer surplus, at least they would
not necessarily do so.
In some circumstances, when a restraint reduces consumer surplus but increases pro-
ducer surplus more than a compensating amount, it may be preferable to impose anti-
trust liability and set a penalty that does not deter the restraint, than to refuse to find a
violation. See Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REv.
652 (1983). When a kind of restraint, such as an agreement to restrict output, almost
always reduces welfare, it may be efficient to condemn all instances of the restraint. This
would be true even if the restraint sometimes increases welfare and even if the antitrust
penalty is set too high, so that the activity is deterred. This essentially is the justification
for a rule of per se illegality. See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text. These
points do not affect the analysis in this Article.
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would not adopt it. While welfare-neutral restraints are of little in-
terest to the analysis in this Article, their undoubted existence un-
derscores an important principle: Agreements should not violate the
antitrust laws unless they cause anticompetitive harm. The burden is
on the prosecution.
In general, an ethical rule can increase welfare by either lowering
costs or increasing demand. The following subsections elaborate the
necessary conditions for each method. The first explores changes in
marginal costs that do not affect demand. The second addresses
changes in demand brought about by activities that alter costs.
A. Lowering the Marginal Costs of Supply
If an association has no market power, any size reduction in any
kind of marginal cost always increases welfare. Market price and
consumer surplus would not change, but producer surplus would in-
crease. For example, in Figure 5, suppose the association, beginning
at supply curve S2 with demand D, agreed to a restraint that re-
duced incremental costs. The supply curve would rotate down and to
the right, to S1. The members' profits would increase, price would
stay pe, and welfare would grow. If the restraint reduced variable
costs, the supply curve would shift down and to the right, and the
same results would hold, except profits would increase even more.
The more intriguing task is to identify the kinds of reductions in
marginal costs that will be profitable and increase welfare when the
association has market power.83 First, a reduction in variable costs
continues to be welfare-enhancing and profitable, assuming demand
is not perfectly inelastic. In Figure 6, the reduction in variable costs
shifts the supply curve from S, to S 2 . Price drops from p, to P2,
output increases from ql to q2, and profits increase from the area in
triangle pIAC to the area in triangle P2BE. Second, a reduction in
incremental costs limited to the early stages of output would result
in a rotation of the supply curve in a counterclockwise direction from
the point at which it intersects with the demand curve. In other
83. An agreement simply to restrain production of some product by firms with
market power can be efficient when the private marginal costs incurred by each producer
do not in the aggregate reflect total, or social marginal costs. In other words, the produc-
tion decisions of each firm may impose externalities on others. The classic presentation of
this possibility was made by Professor Knight using the example of the cost of traffic
congestion as a highway becomes overused. See Knight, Some Fallacies in the Interpre-
tation of Social Cost, 38 Q. J. ECON. 582, 585 (1924). The insight can be generalized,
and has been applied, for example, to production from a common pool. See Landes,
supra note 82, at 658.
words, the marginal cost of selling the last unit of output does not
change, so price and output are unaffected. But profits and welfare
increase because of the savings in marginal costs for the first incre-
ments of production. Third, an agreement that reduced the marginal
costs of producing intermediate units of output would increase prof-
its. The Langenfeld and Morris model, for simplicity, assumes that
the supply curve is a straight line. If this assumption is relaxed, one
can imagine a supply curve that, as a result of some restraint, exhib-
its an outward bulge in the middle, reflecting lower costs for inter-
mediate levels of output, but identical costs for early and late
volumes.
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FIGURE 6
q, q2
The only kind of reduction in marginal costs that would not ap-
pear to increase profits would be the reverse of the cost rise that
increases profits, that is, a reduction in incremental costs at high
levels of output. This would cause a rotation in the supply curve in a
clockwise direction from its origin. But appearances can be deceiv-
ing. Although this kind of a change would reduce profits if price
equals marginal cost, it will likely increase profits if price is deter-
mined by marginal revenue. Thus, for example, if the association
fixes price through an agreement other than the restraint in question,
even a restraint that causes a clockwise rotation of the supply curve
would increase profits.
Or suppose that the industry begins in a monopolistically competi-
tive equilibrium. Price is above marginal cost, but because of entry,
the average total cost curve is tangent to the demand curve at that
price. Profits are zero. Now a restraint is established that causes the
marginal cost curve to rotate down and to the right, and the average
total cost curve to drop down at most output levels. Technically, the
marginal cost curve would not be a straight line in such a situation,
and so the downward rotation would take on a different appearance
from that depicted in previous illustrations. Still, the new marginal
cost curve would be coincident with the old curve at their origins and
lie below it at later points. Price is determined by the intersection of
marginal revenue and the new marginal cost curve. Price is lower,
and quantity is higher. But at that output, price is above average
total cost, and so the firm earns profits. The market is not in equilib-
rium - it will attract entry, which will eliminate the profits. But the
restraint generates profits, so the firms have an incentive to agree to
it. Consumer surplus increases as well. Of course, in a monopolisti-
cally competitive market, any of the other kinds of cost reductions
would also be profitable.
These examples illustrate the effects of various kinds of reductions
in marginal costs in different market structures, as well as the effects
of cost reductions when positing different modes of behavior, under
the assumption of a static demand. However, suppose that this de-
mand assumption is relaxed. Suppose in a market where price is de-
termined by marginal cost, a restraint lowers marginal costs some-
where along the associated curve, but not where the curve intersects
demand. Correspondingly, in a market where price is determined by
marginal revenue, the restraint would reduce marginal costs for
some outputs less than the output dictated by the intersection of
marginal cost and marginal revenue, but not the output associated
with that intersection. However, as output expands, the restraint re-
sults in higher marginal costs. As long as demand remains constant,
the restraint produces no change in price but does increase profits
and welfare. The effect on marginal costs at levels of output in ex-
cess of the amount sold is irrelevant.
Now assume, however, that for reasons unrelated to the restric-
tion, the demand curve shifts or rotates outward. Whether price con-
tinues to be determined by marginal cost or marginal revenue, it will
now be higher and output lower than if the restraint did not exist.
This poses both static and dynamic problems. If the marginal dead-
weight loss, measured by the two possible supply curves given the
new demand, is less than the cost savings produced by the restric-
tion, the restriction would continue to increase welfare. However, if
the deadweight loss exceeds these savings, maintaining the restric-
tion would reduce welfare. Nevertheless, whether the net effect of
the restriction is welfare-reducing depends upon the durations of the
periods of welfare gain and welfare loss, as well as the magnitude of
the effects. In theory, a restraint can increase welfare initially but
reduce welfare later. Thus, when inter-temporal changes in demand
are taken into account, the net effect of a restraint on economic wel-
fare can be negative. This problem would disappear if the association
eliminated the restraint when demand increased. But such a change
could reduce the profits of the association, for the reasons discussed
earlier, and therefore the association would be deterred from making
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Therefore, even if a restriction would have an immediate positive
effect on welfare, it could arguably be condemned on the ground that
the restriction would reduce welfare if demand grows and it is not
rescinded. In short, the argument is that the restraint is likely to
have a net negative effect. The argument is not compelling. It de-
pends upon estimates of future demand - that demand will in-
crease, perhaps substantially, and not thereafter shrink - and upon
a prediction that the restriction will not erode for exogenous reasons.
Further, it implies a willingness to trade-off what are assumed to be
certain immediate gains for speculative distant losses.
The purpose of this discussion was to provide a theoretical analysis
of the ways in which a restraint could be profitable and increase wel-
fare by reducing marginal costs, not to identify association rules that
would have the described effects. It is clear that no professional rule
can be justified on this basis unless the supposed cost savings would
not be realized absent the rule. In other words, one has to conclude
that competition among unrestricted professionals would result in
higher marginal costs.
With this in mind, a few examples can be hypothesized. A rule
that association members must submit disputes among themselves to
arbitration might lower the marginal costs of dispute resolution. 84
An association might impose an ethical obligation to refer clients to
other members who, for reasons of practice specialty or geographic
location, are better suited to provide the services needed. The recip-
rocal nature of the obligation might induce beneficial reallocations of
clients more efficiently than would a system of direct referral pay-
ments, which might be separately prohibited anyway.
Another potential cost-saving rule is a prohibition on one member
hiring employees of another.85 Employees may be privy to confiden-
tial, commercially significant information, such as customer lists.
Moreover, identifying prospective employees and training them both
in general skills and in the idiosyncrasies of a particular employer's
84. Dispute resolution provisions have historically been a common feature of asso-
ciation codes. Indeed, one historian reports that "provisions for settling disputes without
recourse to the law ... have their precedents in Saxon gilds ...... G. UNWIN, THE GILDS
AND COMPANIES OF LONDON 53 (1938).
85. The codes of many associations contain restrictions on hiring other members'
employees. See, for example, the rules of the following associations: American Institute
of Accountants, reprinted in E. HEERMANCE, supra note 18, at 6 (1923 version); Na-
tional Association of Real Estate Boards, reprinted in id. 452 (1924 version) and Na-
tional Association of Realtors, reprinted in J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at 676 (1962 ver-
sion); National Auctioneers Association, reported id. at 111 (1949 version).
practice are likely to require an investment by the employer, and
other professionals can free ride on much of that investmdnt. A so-
called "anti-pirating" rule can allow members to reduce the variable
costs of maintaining trade secrets and of training employees when
establishing and. enforcing contractual obligations on the part of
each employee is a more costly alternative.
Finally, a restriction on the hours of operation has been offered as
an example of a restraint that raises incremental costs.8  If a group
of car dealers agree to be closed evenings and weekends, the margi-
nal costs of selling cars may increase because more expensive activi-
ties would have to be substituted to sell those cars that would have
been purchased by consumers at convenient times. But suppose bar-
bers in a town agree to be closed on Wednesday afternoons. The
market is characterized by monopolistic competition with free entry,
and so each shop, and the industry as a whole, has excess capacity.
Absent the restriction, some consumers would choose Wednesday af-
ternoon to be shorn, but the inconvenience of selecting another time
has a trivial effect at least on the marginal consumer. Such a restric-
tion might have no effect on the marginal costs of providing initial
numbers of haircuts and reduce the marginal costs of providing in-
termediate numbers. Yet, the restriction would increase the costs of
numbers that exceed current demand, assuming that operating
Wednesday afternoon would be the cheapest way to provide addi-
tional haircuts. It would therefore allow existing facilities to be used
more efficiently to satisfy current demand. 7
B. Increasing Demand
Suppliers' actions that increase the demand for a service typically
impose costs on the suppliers. Suppliers would have no interest in
incurring avoidable costs to increase demand unless the increase
more than compensates them for the additional costs. Therefore, an
action taken to increase demand may increase profits and welfare.
However, as William Comanor has pointed out in another context,
suppliers can increase profits by increasing the demand of the margi-
nal consumer even when the demand-inducing action is not valued
86. See Langenfeld & Morris, Analyzing Agreements, supra note 16. For a differ-
ent argument that agreements restricting hours of operation should be illegal, see R.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 85-86 (1978). Such
an agreement was found unlawful by the Federal Trade Commission in Detroit Auto
Dealers Ass'n, 111 F.T.C. 417, 499 (1989).
87. A rule that may fall somewhere between the apparently anticompetitive re-
striction discussed by Langenfeld and Morris and the apparently procompetitive one hy-
pothesized in this Article is a rule tentatively adopted by the American Optometric Asso-
ciation in 1924. The restriction provided, "It is unethical and forbidden to keep open
office or place of business on national holidays, State holidays, or Sundays." See E.
HEERMANCE, supra note 18, at 400.
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by the infra-marginal consumer.8 8 The shape of the demand curve
changes. In such a case, the action can increase profits but reduce
welfare. Though this is undoubtedly true in theory, it is nearly im-
possible to determine empirically that an action increasing demand
at the margin had no effect on infra-marginal demand.8 9 For this
reason, a marginal increase in demand that exceeds a marginal in-
crease in cost will be assumed to increase welfare, unless otherwise
noted.
Any action that increases the demand for a service can be viewed
as increasing the quality of the service. In general, quality can be
enhanced by actions that increase fixed costs or variable costs; "vari-
able costs" for present purposes means any costs that vary with out-
put in the reasonably short run. The classic example of a fixed cost is
the investment necessary to qualify for and secure a license to prac-
tice. The traditional economic justification for licensing requirements
is based on a presumed asymmetry of information between the pro-
vider and consumer of services. 90 Suppose consumers are unable to
evaluate the quality of professional services even after they are ren-
dered. An unsuccessful litigant does not know whether the lawyer
was incompetent or the case was weak; a patient does not know
whether the illness persisted because it was misdiagnosed by the doc-
tor or because the disease was incurable. Consumers are therefore
willing to pay for the average quality of services available, because
they cannot discern below and above average performance. Suppli-
ers, on the other hand, are not willing to incur the costs necessary to
provide services of above average quality because they will not be
able to recoup the investment. Indeed, suppliers have an incentive to
provide substandard services, for they will earn a premium at prices
determined by average quality. Therefore, the quality of services in
the market, spirals downward, and the lower quality of services re-
88. Comanor's insight addressed the practice of resale price maintenance. Coma-
nor, Vertical Price Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy,
98 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1985).
89. See, e.g., P. IPPOLITO. RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC EVIDENCE
FROM LITIGATION, 23 Bureau of Economics Staff Report, Fed'l Trade Comm'n (April
1988).
90. Other justifications for licensing exist. For example, transactions between sup-
pliers and consumers may impose negative externalities. A physician who fails to cure a
contagious disease may cause an epidemic. In such a case, even a consumer with perfect
information about the quality of the physician might not be willing to pay for the optimal
level of competence because the prospective private loss is far smaller than the possible
social loss. This is an economic argument. By contrast, one could argue paternalistically
that consumers simply should not be permitted to purchase certain kinds of services, such
as medical care, that are below a prescribed level of quality.
suits in a dampening of demand. This market failure has been
dubbed the "lemon" phenomenon. 91
One response to the lemon problem is to require government per-
mission, or a license, to provide services and establish licensing stan-
dards that ensure that providers meet a desired level of competence.
Thus, individuals who graduate from medical school would typically
provide better care than those with no professional training. The in-
vestments required to satisfy licensure requirements, such as four
years' tuition, would raise the long-run industry supply curve and
market prices. But if demand increased sufficiently as a result, total
welfare would increase. This is not to say, of course, that licensing
does increase welfare, only that it could.
Licensure, by definition, requires governmental action-it is the
government granting authority to practice a profession.92 Therefore,
licensure is not usually associated with a private organization's code
of ethics. However, the government can establish a general scheme
of licensure, or particular licensure requirements, at the behest of an
association. 3 To the extent that an eligibility requirement is the
product of private and governmental action, it is no different from a
restriction on conduct specified in an ethical code and thereafter
adopted by a government entity. Conceivably an association might
establish an eligibility requirement that increased total welfare yet
left profits unaffected. As noted above, such an altruistic motive is
an unlikely explanation for behavior. Eschewing that explanation,
though, does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that any eligibility
requirement adopted at the behest of a private association has an
anticompetitive effect. The imposition of a new requirement is likely
91. There is significant literature examining the proposition that asymmetric infor-
mation may cause market failure and reduce the quality of products available. See, e.g.,
Akerlof, The Market for "'Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970); Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Mini-
mum Quality-Standards, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1328 (1979); Leland, Minimum Quality
Standards and Licensing in Markets with Asymmetric Information, in OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSURE AND REGULATION (S. Rottenberg ed. 1979); Schmalensee, A Model of Ad-
vertising and Product Quality, 86 J. Pol. Econ. 485 (1978); Smallwood & Conlisk,
Product Quality in Markets Where Consumers Are Imperfectly Informed, 93 Q. J.
ECON. 1 (1979); Stuart, Consumer Protection in Markets with Informationally Weak
Buyers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 562 (1981).
92. I adopt here the traditional definitions of licensure, certification, and registra-
tion. Licensure means that a practitioner is legally prohibited from providing services
without permission granted by a government authority. Certification means that any
practitioner can offer services, but only an individual meeting prescribed standards and
approved by a certifying agency, government or private, can claim to be certified or use
specified -titles. Registration implies that all practitioners must notify a government au-
thority that they are providing services. Notification requirements are generally minimal,
however, and registration has little commercial significance. See S. YOUNG, supra note
15, at 5.
93. Indeed, a government theoretically could delegate to an association the right to
establish licensing standards for an entire profession.
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to generate short-run profits for incumbent suppliers whether the re-
quirement increases or decreases total welfare, that is, whether it
pushes the demand curve out sufficiently to offset the higher costs or
has no effect on demand. The fact that a rent-seeking group of pro-
fessionals secured a licensure requirement does not prove that the
requirement is inefficient.
An association can impose eligibility requirements for membership
that are not adopted by the government as conditions for licensure.
A state, for example, might require all physicians to hold medical
degrees, but a society of surgeons might require a surgical residency
to join. A private eligibility requirement can raise the quality of the
services the association's members provide. That is, the quality of the
services the hypothetical society renders may be higher if the mem-
bers have completed surgical residencies than if they have not. No-
tice that when a private group or a government entity uses an eligi-
bility requirement to raise the quality of services provided, the
requirement generally serves as a surrogate measure of quality. In
contrast, a consumer may derive more utility from receiving services
from a professional who possesses a certain credential, such as a
Harvard diploma, than from one who does not, even if the services
provided are objectively identical. To that extent, the credential
would be a direct measure of quality because it increases demand by
itself. However, eligibility requirements are typically used because
they are positively correlated to the quality of services provided; ful-
fillment of the eligibility requirement can be determined with rela-
tive ease, and directly assessing the quality of services provided by
the practitioner is difficult.
The essence'of the market failure that might justify a government-
imposed eligibility requirement is an informational asymmetry. This
is the same condition that can lead to a welfare-enhancing private
eligibility requirement. 94 Suppose the cost to consumers of evaluat-
ing the quality of professional services is very high. An association
94. Asymmetric information in a market is not limited to professional services, and
it is not a recent phenomenon. In 1408, knife-making in London was divided into three
crafts: the bladesmiths, who made the blade; the cutlers, who fitted the handle; and the
sheathers, who supplied the sheath. The cutlers sold the finished product. They com-
plained that "the blame and scandal of bad workmanship" fell upon them, particularly
the faulty work of the sheathers. In other words, consumers did not have the information
to distinguish among the three trades, and so the deficient work of one trade imposed
negative externalities on another. In response, the cutlers were granted authority "to in-
stitute a scrutiny, along with two master sheathers, ofall sheaths made in England or
sold in London." G. UNWIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVEN-
TEENTH CENTURIES 24-25 (1904).
could assess quality and represent to consumers that its members
provide high quality services. Membership in the association then be-
comes a relatively cheap signal of quality to consumers, a device that
lowers the cost of acquiring information about quality. It becomes a
certification, like a trademark or servicemark.
Of course, the association itself is assessing quality through eligi-
bility requirements that are mere surrogates. The consumer might be
able to employ the same surrogates without the aid of the associa-
tion. But determining what the appropriate surrogates are is likely to
be more costly for consumers than for the society of experts. Does
completion of a residency in general surgery bear upon an oral sur-
geon's ability to reconstruct a jaw? Further, some surrogates may be
generated independently by the association. For example, the associ-
ation may devise an examination or conduct a training program. Fi-
nally, the association is likely to use a cluster of eligibility require-
ments. The consumer can more easily determine the single fact of
association membership rather than whether the practitioner satisfies
each of the criteria the association would have used.
Recall that no association's rules can have an adverse impact on
welfare unless the association has market power. If eligibility re-
quirements are purely private, the association cannot have derived
power through government action. In that case, the association must
use its own economic power to force enough professionals to meet
eligibility requirements so that market price is affected. However,
even if an association can and does force the entire profession to join
and comply with its eligibility requirements, it will not necessarily be
acting anticompetitively. If the source of the market power is the
eligibility requirements themselves, it is not anticompetitive to force
suppliers who wish to take advantage of the demand created by the
eligibility requirements to comply with them. Thus, in order for eli-
gibility requirements to be welfare-reducing, they must either be
adopted by the state or be imposed by an association that profession-
als must join for essential economic benefits unrelated to the require-
ments themselves.95
95. A group of firms may agree to embark on a risky new venture. A restriction
among the venturers may not be necessary to achieve the static productive efficiencies
inherent in the enterprise but may nonetheless generate short-run profits. The venture's
economic power therefore may be independent of the restriction. But if the possibility of
monopoly rents was the catalyst for undertaking the joint venture, the restriction cannot
be eliminated without deterring future, efficient joint arrangements. To that extent, an-
ticompetitive rules that do not form the basis of an association's market power in a static
sense cannot be attacked with impunity, for they may be efficient in a dynamic sense.
If an association has market power unrelated to a particular restriction and not a prod-
uct of law, one would expect competing associations to be formed that do not impose the
anticompetitive rule. Some have argued that new associations will not be able to arise
because of economies of scale. See Langenfeld & Morris, Analyzing Agreements, supra
note 16. It is not clear, however, exactly what functions an association performs that are
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If an association does turn to the state to impose its eligibility re-
quirements on an entire profession, is the inference inescapable that
the requirements reduce welfare? The answer is no. As explained
above, a rent-seeking group of suppliers can benefit from the imposi-
tion of licensing requirements even when those requirements increase
welfare. But if demand is enhanced when servikes are provided by
suppliers who satisfy eligibility requirements, should not the associa-
tion be content merely to impose them on its own members and al-
low non-members - uncertified professionals - to charge less for
their services, which consumers value less? The anticompetitive ex-
planation for enlisting government aid is that by increasing the long-
run marginal costs and hence the price charged for services of non-
members, the residual demand for members' services, which are to
some degree substitutable, increases.
There is another explanation, however. Certification is intellectual
property. Those who possess certification possess something of value
only to the extent that others can be excluded. It is fundamentally
like any other kind of property. Those who would invest in creating a
certification mechanism, in informing consumers of the certification's
meaning, and in becoming certified will not do so unless their invest-
ments can be recouped.9 A farmer will not invest in growing corn
unless he can prevent others from taking his crop. In other words,
the investor must be able to prevent free riding. Free riding is pre-
vented, which is to say that property rights are protected, generally
by resort to the common law. An owner sues an infringer for theft of
the property right. However, resort to the courts imposes private
costs on the plaintiff. Those costs mount as the existence of the prop-
erty right and the fact of infringement become more difficult to
prove, and consequently, as the frequency of infringement increases.
When tangible property is stolen, ownership and theft are rela-
tively easy to prove. As the probability of apprehension and the pen-
alty increase, the incidence of theft will decline. The professional as-
subject to economies of scale. Consequently, it is also unclear whether any diseconomies
would be substantial enough to permit an association to maintain a rule which has a
significant anticompetitive effect. Associations undoubtedly supply information, and be-
cause information is a public good, there are scale economies in its provision. But the
free-rider problems inherent in the provision of a public good did not prevent the associa-
tion from forming to begin with. It is not clear why those problems would prevent com-
peting associations from being formed. Certainly many professions have more than one
association.
96. For general discussions of the economics of property rights, see R. POSNER,
supra note 7, at 29-33; R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 7, at 99-149 (1988); Eco-
NOmiC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW supra note 7; De Alessi, supra note 7.
sociation is not as favorably positioned to protect its property right in
its certification. Suppose the American Society of Engineers estab-
lishes costly eligibility requirements for membership, and consumers
are willing to pay more for the services of members. Competing pro-
fessionals form the American Academy of Engineers and impose
trivial membership requirements. If consumers do not distinguish be-
tween the associations, Academy members will be able to charge the
same prices that Society members charge - and free ride on the
investments of the Society. Although the Society may sue the Acad-
emy, it will not succeed unless a court finds that the Society had a
common law or statutory property right that was infringed by the
Academy. In the process, the Society will have incurred litigation
costs. In the case hypothesized, whether a legal right has been in-
fringed is by no means clear, because the Academy did use a differ-
ent name. And even if the Society wins, the remedy may only be an
injunction prohibiting future use of the name. This kind of penalty is
not likely to have deterred the Academy in the first place. It would
be akin to telling the thief that if he is caught, he will have to give
back the booty.
One option the Society has is to create the public perception that
it is different from and better than the Academy. But creating this
perception will be costly. The Society will have to distinguish itself
not only from the Academy, but possibly from other newly formed
organizations as well - the College and the Association. Indeed, the
more successful its efforts, the more valuable its certification will be-
come and the greater the incentive for others to free ride. The task
of differentiating its certification will be difficult if differences in
names and insignia are subtle and because the nature of professional
services tends to prevent consumers from quickly assessing the qual-
ity of the services rendered.97 The task will be even more difficult if
consumers react negatively to an association's efforts to promote its
certification. In all, establishing a valuable public perception of a
professional certification will be expensive. And maintaining that
value by prosecuting infringers will also be costly.98
The private costs of establishing property rights within the legal
97. The problem of distinguishing indicia of certification is not new. In 1408,
bladesmiths in London complained to the mayor that "country makers were in the habit
of selling blades with trademarks resembling their own to the cutlers," who assembled
finished knives. In response, "an arrangement was made under which the cutlers agreed
not to take such wares, and the bladesmiths were bound not to increase the price of
blades except by advice of the two masters of each craft jointly." G. UNWIN, INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION, supra note 94, at 25. It is not clear whether the cutlers themselves were
misled by the country makers' trademark or were searching for the best price.
98. For a discussion of the significance of the costs of policing property rights, see
Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J. LAW & ECON. 11,
16-26 (1964).
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system, and of enforcing those rights, may become so high that a
would-be owner cannot economically incur them. Where intellectual
property is concerned, the legal system may be particularly undevel-
oped; regardless of the potential value of recognizing those rights,
the cost of defining them is very high.9 If an association cannot eco-
nomically protect itself from free riding, it may never be formed.
Potential members would pursue the next best alternative of avoid-
ing the investments that would increase demand but could not be
recovered.
Alternatively, the association might attempt to escape private
costs by enlisting the aid of the government. If the state investigated
and prosecuted infringements, as the police and state's attorney
might respond to the theft of tangible property, the association could
reduce its costs of maintaining the value of its certification. But in
fact there is little public enforcement of rights in private certifica-
tion. Indeed, public enforcement is impossible to the extent that the
legal system does not recognize the underlying property rights.
Moreover, the association would not avoid the costs of creating the
value of its certification. The government could respond by adopting
the private eligibility requirements as requirements for government
certification. 100 Those property rights are more likely to be recog-
nized, and the government would be likely to enforce them, so that
the private association would avoid some costs. Still, the public costs
of government certification might be high. The government might
99. Professor Demsetz, one of the pioneers in the exploration of property rights,
has argued that property rights are created when the value of having them, determined
by the demand for the underlying subject of the right, exceeds the costs of defining them.
See Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AMER. ECON. REv. 347 (1967).
He applies this thesis to explain the development of property rights among certain North
American Indian tribes. Where the burgeoning fur trade made rights in hunting territo-
ries valuable and the forest tertain made defining those rights feasible, rights were estab-
lished. They were not established among the Southwestern Plains Indians at that time
because those tribes lived among no animals of commercial significance. Therefore the
costs of defining hunting rights in the plains was high.
100. In effect, private certification standards were adopted as public certification
requirements when the Apothecaries Act became law in England in 1815. That Act gave
the Society of Apothecaries the right to determine who could use the title "apothecary"
by establishing education requirements and proficiency exams.
[T]he act gave the Society power to prevent unqualified persons from calling
themselves apothecaries anywhere in England or Wales. These powers were
quite unprecedented at the time. Both Royal Colleges [of Physicians and of
Surgeons] were examining bodies, but the Surgeons had no power to prevent
anyone from calling himself a surgeon, qualified or not, and even the august
Physicians' authority, founded on a Royal Charter, only extended to London
and the district seven miles about.
W. READER. supra note 19, at 51.
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instead respond by imposing the association's eligibility requirements
on the entire profession and thereafter policing its licensure man-
date. The association might nevertheless have an interest in promot-
ing the value of the profession, but it would not have to distinguish
its members from other professionals in the market.
This discussion is not meant to suggest that the government should
impose licensure requirements, require public certification, or police
rights in private certification.101 Nor is it intended to demonstrate
that an association would always prefer state-imposed requirements
to its own efforts to create and maintain private certification. An
association may benefit more from distinguishing its members from
other suppliers in the market, despite the private costs incurred and
the residual free riding, than from operating in a market of undiffer-
entiated, high quality providers. Rather, the discussion is meant to
demonstrate that an association's appeal for state help does not
prove that the eligibility requirements reduce welfare. Eligibility re-
quirements may increase welfare, and a private certification mecha-
nism may be the most efficient way of ensuring that the value-in-
creasing investments are made. But if the private association can
avoid costs by procuring government assistance, it may try to secure
that help. In that event, the association would solicit government aid
not to increase costs of supply or demand, since it could accomplish
the latter by private certification. Rather, the association would seek
the government's help in order to reduce its own marginal costs of
maintaining the value of its certification. All that is needed is posi-
tive, avoidable costs associated with private certification, and those
are virtually certain to exist.102
To summarize, eligibility requirements imposed by a government
through a licensure system can (not will) increase welfare by cor-
recting a market failure caused by asymmetric information. A pri-
vate association may adopt eligibility requirements in response to the
same kind of information failure. Membership acts to certify the
quality of the services provided. The requirements must increase de-
mand for the services of members. In order for the requirements to
serve a certification function, consumers must be cognizant of and
place a value on membership, though the association need not neces-
101. As a matter of economic policy, certification, whether public or private, may
generally be preferable to licensure. If the impetus for regulation of any form is imper-
fect information, the narrowest regulatory response may have the least social cost. In a
world of perfect information, certification would allow those consumers who were unwill-
ing to pay for high quality service the opportunity to purchase low quality service. That
opportunity would be denied under a licensure system, which would exclude low quality
suppliers from the market. Whether certification is economically a better policy depends
on the costs of operating a reasonably effective certification system.
102. Indeed, an association may risk antitrust liability and treble damages for at-
tempting to protect a property right in certification.
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sarily promote actively the significance of membership. 10 3 If the as-
sociation has no market power unrelated to its eligibility require-
ments, the requirements will increase welfare. Even if the association
has such economic power, the requirements may increase welfare.
Moreover, the association may solicit and secure government assis-
tance in imposing welfare-enhancing restraints on the industry when
avoiding the potentially infinite private costs of establishing and
maintaining property rights in certification is profitable.
Compliance with eligibility requirements, as the term is used here,
imposes fixed costs on professionals. The term "conduct restriction"
is used here to identify rules that impose variable costs on profes-
sionals. Conduct restrictions include both prohibitions on engaging in
specified activities and commands to engage in specified conduct.
Rules that regulate the behavior of professionals as they provide ser-
vices will inherently affect the marginal costs of supply. In fact, most
ethical rules, as commonly understood, govern the conduct of eligible
professionals.
Conduct restrictions, because they affect marginal costs, are sus-
ceptible to the anticompetitive explanations discussed above based on
raising marginal costs. 04 However, they are capable of increasing
welfare in essentially the same way and for the same reasons as eli-
gibility requirements. Like eligibility requirements, they can enhance
quality, or increase demand. They can do so directly, if the conduct
induced is itself valued, or indirectly, if that conduct is perceived as
signalling high quality services. Consumer welfare may increase if
an association can reduce the search costs of locating suppliers who
adhere to a set of conduct restrictions. However, all of the problems
associated with certification discussed in the context of eligibility re-
quirements apply with full force here. 10 5
Conduct restrictions that shift the short-run supply curve up, and
103. Some associations do in fact explicitly encourage members to promote the
associations' insignia. See, e.g., the Principles of Professional Conduct and Ethics of the
American Society of Travel Agents, reprinted in J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at 765 (1971
version) ("ASTA Members should use advertising materials to acquaint the public with
the advantages to be gained through the use of the ASTA Travel Agent.").
104. See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
105. Carr and Mathewson argue that, in response to asymmetric information, law
partnerships, as opposed to solo practices, are formed so that the firm can internally
monitor the services provided to clients and deter chiseling, thereby protecting the capital
investment in the firm's brand name. Carr & Mathewson, The Economics of Law Firms:
A Study in the Legal Organization of the Firm, 33 J. L. & ECON. 307 (1990). Their
argument is consistent with the theory set out in this section. The quality of legal services
increases as chiseling is deterred.
increase variable costs, in the terminology of Langenfeld and Morris,
will increase welfare if the restrictions push the demand curve out
sufficiently far. An association will profit from them only if welfare
increases. Conduct restrictions that force the supply curve to rotate
counterclockwise from its origin, 106 that increase incremental costs,
can generate quasi-rents even when they do not affect demand. Con-
duct restrictions that increase incremental costs can nevertheless in-
crease total welfare, but only when they increase demand enough so
that the resulting sum of consumer and producer surplus exceeds the
previous total. Unlike an increase in variable costs, an increase in
incremental costs that does increase demand may be profitable even
though economic welfare declines.
An example of a demand-increasing restraint that also causes an
upward shift in marginal costs is illustrated in Figure 7. Absent the
restraint, the demand and supply curves are D1 and S1, respectively.
Price is pl, quantity is qj, consumer surplus is triangle CFpj, and
producer surplus is pIFA. When the restraint is imposed, the supply
curve shifts up to S2, the demand curve shifts out to D2, price in-
creases to P2, and quantity increases to q2. Consumer surplus in-
creases to EGP2, and producer surplus increases to p2GB. Economic
welfare increases because the sum of consumer and producer surplus









As is evident from the discussion of eligibility requirements, a con-
duct restriction generally can increase demand only if it satisfies two
106. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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conditions. First, the restriction must induce conduct that is more
valuable to consumers than the conduct that would otherwise occur.
Second, embodying the restriction in an association's rule must be
efficient for some reason, either because it reduces the costs of induc-
ing the desirable behavior or because it reduces the consumers'
search costs of locating desirable practitioners.
The value-increasing nature of the conduct induced can sometimes
be easily identified. For example, suppose an association's rule pro-
hibits a member from simultaneously representing clients with ad-
verse interests without their consent. 107 Engaging in that kind of rep-
resentation obviously could result in impaired services being
rendered to one of the clients. So too, a rule that prohibits members
from disclosing a client's confidential information 0 8 would inher-
ently increase the value of the services rendered by protecting clients
from the personal or commercial injury that such disclosure could
107. Rules designed to insulate the professional from financial incentives to offer
advice contrary to the best interests of the client are perhaps the most common in associ-
ation codes. Rules explicitly restricting the ability of members to render services to cli-
ents with conflicting interests include those of the following associations: American Insti-
tute of Electrical Engineers, reprinted in E. HEERMANCE, supra note 18, at 167 (1912
version); American Bar Association, reprinted in id. at 280 (1908 version); American
Institute of Architects, reprinted in J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at 92 (1972 version); Finan-
cial Analysts Federation and Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts, reprinted in id.
at 305 (1969 version); American Society of Landscape Architects, reprinted in id. at 398
(1962 version).
Other rules, apparently designed to protect professional judgment from compromising
firancial incentives, are those that prohibit a professional from accepting commissions
from non-professionals for using or recommending their services and from paying com-
missions to or accepting commissions from other professionals for referrals. A few of the
associations with rules ef this kind are the following: American Institute of Accountants,
reprinted in E. HEERMANCE, id. at 5 (1923 version); American Institute of Architects,
reprinted in id. at 22 (1922 version); American Dental Association, reprinted in id. at
143 (1923 version) and in J. CLAPP, supra ncte 18, at 227 (1972 version); American
Society of Heating and Ventilating Engineers (1921 version), American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (1922 version), Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers(1923 version), reprinted in, E. HEERMANCE, supra note 18, at 164; American Medical
Association, reprinted in, id. at 345 (1912 version) and in J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at
565 (date of version undisclosed); American Pharmaceutical Association, reprinted in, E.
HEERMANCE, supra note 18, at 422 (1922 version) and in J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at
554 (1969 version); Society of Real Estate Appraisers, reprinted in, J. CLAPP, id. at 71
(1971 version); American Osteopathic Association, reprinted in id. at 576 (1965 version);
American Psychological Association, reprinted in, id. at 631 (1963 version).
108. Associations with rules of this kind include the following: National Society of
Professional Engineers, reprinted in, J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at 254 (1971 version);
American Medical Association, reprinted in, id. at 565 (date of version not disclosed);
National Society of Interior Designers, reprinted in, id. at 388 (date of version not dis-
closed); American Association of Marriage and Family Counselors, reprinted in, id. at
432 (1962 version); American Nurses' Association, repinted in, id. at 485 (1968 version);
American Psychological Association, reprinted in id. at 628 (1963 version).
cause.
1 0 9
However, the nature of other restrictions may be more subtle.
Suppose a rule prohibits members from soliciting a client while some
actual or potential employment relationship exists between the client
and another member. 110 Depending on the parameters of the rule, it
could increase consumer search costs. The rule could also reduce
consumer search costs, and otherwise increase demand, by creating a
private system of property rights in activities designed to identify
and secure clients. Professionals make investments to obtain clients.
They will not be compensated for those client-specific costs that are
incurred prior to the time the prospective client assumes an obliga-
tion to pay. To the extent thata competing professional could obtain
the client before the obligation attaches, the probability of receiving
compensation declines, the amount of investment that is justified by
109. An interesting example of a rule that could be explained as an attempt to
deter demand-reducing behavior or a device to increase marginal costs of supply is a ban
on the use of contingency fees. See the 1923 Rules of Professional Conduct of the Ameri-
can Institute of Accountants, reprinted in, E. HEERMANCE, supra note 18, at 6, and the
1973 rules of its successor organization, the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants, reprinted in, J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at 11. Use of a contingency fee arrange-
ment will create an incentive for the professional to reach the result that will maximize
her compensation, whether or not that result imposes costs on third parties. For example,
investors may rely upon the auditing services of an accountant provided to a firm, or a
government agency may rely upon a tax return or proposal for funds prepared by the
accountant. If the accountant is induced to provide inferior work because of the contin-
gency arrangement, the value of accounting services will decline. An association may
want to certify that its members do not engage in the deleterious practice in order to
reduce the search costs of locating high quality practitioners. Moreover, if inferior work
later causes serious harm, the reputation of the entire profession may suffer. An associa-
tion may want to avoid the negative externality that it would suffer as a result of a non-
member's action.
On the other hand, if the use of contingency fee arrangements is an efficient method of
attracting clients, who would not otherwise retain the professional, a prohibition may
increase the incremental costs of all suppliers or the marginal costs of a subgroup, such
as new entrants. Methods of determining what effect a restriction has are discussed in
the last section of the Article.
110. Rules that restrict solicitation of another's client or customer are common
among associations and take many forms. Some rules prohibit attempts to supplant a
competing member after "definite steps" have been taken toward employment. See, for
example, the rules of the following associations: American Institute of Architects, re-
printed in, E. HEERMANCE, supra note 18, at 23 (1922 version); American Institute of
Consulting Engineers, reprinted in, id. at 166 (1921 version); American Congress on
Surveying and Mapping, reprinted in, J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at 748 (1959 version).
Others prohibit solicitation after another member has been engaged by or has entered
into a contract with the client. See, for example, the rules of the following associations:
American Society of Appraisers, reprinted in, id. at 63 (1968 version); Board for Certifi-
cation of Genealogists, reprinted in, id. at 323 (date of version not disclosed); American
Institute of Interior Designers, reprinted in, id. at 384 (date of version not disclosed);
American Society of Landscape Architects, reprinted in id. at 400 (1962 version). Still
other rules constitute general bans. See, e.g., American Institute of Accountants, re-
printed in E. HEERMANCE, supra note 18, at 6 (1923 version). And others prescribe
rather elaborate restrictions. See, e.g., National Association of Real Estate Boards, re-
printed in id. at 452 (1924 version).
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the expected compensation drops, and the services to the prospective
client diminish. Moreover, if a competing professional can free ride
on another's investment in locating a client, the level of that invest-
ment will decline.
Consider again the ban on advertising. Suppose consumers derive
more utility from physicians who do not advertise than from those
who do. Economics takes personal tastes as a given. For whatever
reason, these consumers derive positive utility from receiving services
from professionals who do not advertise, just as they might prefer
pickled beets to filet mignon. Some consumers may even use the fact
of advertising as a surrogate for assessing the quality of the services
offered. They reason that good physicians do not advertise. The pos-
sibility that advertising can cause disutility is not far-fetched. Profes-
sions have historically cultivated the impression that their members
do not offer services primarily for pecuniary gain. Professionals offer
services to promote the public good, and if they earn a living wage in
the process, so much the better. A host of restrictions can follow
from this premise, such as that a professional must provide free ser-
vices to an indigent person in need of help.111 Advertising may sug-
gest that the professional is motivated by commercial gain. Consum-
ers may believe that practitioners interested principally in
commercial success will not provide the quality of services that
others offer.
Now the argument may be true only because the profession made
it true by inducing the perception. Although members of a profession
may be no less motivated to pursue profits than used car dealers, if
consumers believe they receive better services from public-spirited
professionals, they do. In this respect, a profession will have nurtured
a valuable perception, just as a myriad of commercial enterprises
111. See, e.g., The Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Associa-
tion, adopted 1912, reprinted in, E. HEERMANCE, supra note 18, at 345 (The "poverty of
a patient and the mutual professional obligation of physicians should command the gra-
tuitous services of a physician."); the Code of Ethics of the American Osteopathic Asso-
ciation, adopted 1904, id. at 354 ("[P]overty... should always be recognized as present-
ing [a] valid claim[] for gratuitous services."); and the Code of Ethics of the American
Chiropractic Association, adopted in 1971, reprinted in, J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at 166
("[Ploverty .... (and) the poorly remunerated occupation of some individual patient...
should be recognized as presenting valid claims for gratuitous services.").
Perhaps the most striking example, or maybe the most lurid, of an obligation to serve
the public interest at personal sacrifice is contained in the 1919 Code of Ethics of the
National Funeral Directors Association of the United States, reprinted in E. HEER-
MANCE, supra note 18, at 517. A provision states, "No funeral director, in case of epi-
demic or contagious disease, should shirk his professional duties, even though his life may
be in jeopardy." Id.
have generated valuable consumer impressions through advertising.
A beer company that trumpets its contributions to a clean water
fund may stimulate sales to environment-conscious consumers. An
electric utility may generate valuable good will by telling consumers
to conserve energy. An automobile manufacturer may profit by cre-
ating the impression that sexy people drive its cars.
One might respond that this argument proves too much. Any com-
mercial enterprise can claim that an advertising ban will increase
value. But in fact, consumers may not react in the same way to ad-
vertising by different suppliers. Consumers expect car dealers to ad-
vertise, and they presumably would not be willing to pay any more
to a dealer who did not. That simply may not be true for cardiolo-
gists. One might also argue that professionals should be prevented
from fostering a misimpression - if professionals are not allowed to
prohibit advertising, they will advertise, and consumers will come to
expect professionals to advertise. But this would deny a profession
the value of the impression it has already cultivated, as it would con-
demn any advertiser for reaping profits from a favorable illusion that
it conjured up. It would also impair consumer sovereignty by dictat-
ing the permissible sources of utility.
A welfare-enhancing explanation of conduct restrictions requires
more than a showing that consumers value the conduct the restric-
tions are designed to induce. Embodying the behavioral dictates in
association rules must also be efficient. Rules may be necessary
largely because of the reduction in search costs associated with certi-
fication.112 If a number of activities combine to affect the overall
quality of the services rendered, a consumer might be able to assess
the quality of a provider by discerning certification more cheaply
than by evaluating each element of conduct. The certification will
continue to be useful only if the association ensures that members
comply with the restrictions. Consumers therefore identify associa-
tion membership with quality service, whether or not the association
actively promotes the perception.
Suppose an association prescribes a number of conduct restrictions
that increase demand. Members charge a higher price to cover the
higher costs of higher quality services. Other professionals will want
to charge the same prices for inferior services, and so the association
will have to deny membership to them to preserve the value of the
certification. These denied competitors may allege that exclusion
from the association is anticompetitive, arguing that the ability of
association members to charge higher prices proves that the associa-
tion has market power. Collectively denying competitors the ability
to charge higher prices because they do not provide the quality of
112. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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service that warrants those prices can violate no intelligible principle
of antitrust law. Still, antitrust enforcement is imperfect, and denial
is risky. Further, because the association would like to avoid some of
the costs of policing its rules it enlists the aid of the state.
If preserving the value of certification is the objective, one might
conclude that the association would only be justified in soliciting as-
sistance to enforce deception laws or coincident government certifica-
tion. But this assumes that certification can be established and pro-
tected economically. In fact, no certification, public or private, is
perfect or free. The actions of non-certified professionals may impose
negative externalities on their certified competitors. For example,
consumers may associate the injury-producing conduct of one non-
certified accountant with all accountants. They may generalize,
rather than reasoning that their experiences and observations of dis-
reputable conduct by non-certified practitioners has no bearing on
the expected quality of the services of certified professionals. The
incident might instead increase the value of certification, and the as-
sociation would surely have an incentive to disassociate itself from
the culprit and emphasize to consumers the importance of member-
ship.' 13 However, certification may not protect high quality profes-
sionals from being injured by the actions of others, and in any event
it will be expensive and become more so as it becomes more
successful." 4
113. The negative externalities associated with disreputable conduct by some mem-
bers of a profession reportedly led to the creation of the "Realtor" trademark and a
national code of ethics for real estate brokers who belonged to the forerunner of the
National Association of Realtors. The term was coined by a past president of the Minne-
apolis Real Estate Board. On his way to a board meeting, he saw a newspaper with the
headline, "Real Estate Man Swindles a Poor Widow." The culprit was not a member of
the local board, yet he had "besmirched" every broker in the city. The officil suggested
adopting a title that would single out members and imply that the board vouched for
them as qualified and responsible. The term "Realtor" was chosen. See P. DAVIES, REAL
ESTATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 110-114 (1958).
Similarly, unrespectable conduct by some attorneys, as opposed to barristers, in eight-
eenth-century England purportedly convinced "reputable members of the profession that
they would never get their claims to higher standing taken seriously unless they actively
discountenanced and deterred disgraceful practices." In or before 1739, therefore, they
founded in London "a voluntary professional association, the Society of Gentlemen Prac-
tisers in the Courts of Law and Equity, commonly called the Law Society, and one of its
principal objects was to clean up attorneys' practice." W. READER, supra note 14, at 28.
114. One association tried to capture the essence of negative and positive externali-
ties generated by professional conduct, and found that one cliche simply would not do:
"The professional landscape architect acts and practices always in a manner bringing
credit to the honor and dignity of the profession of landscape architecture.... This is a
broad recognition of the principle that 'one bad apple spoils the barrel' and the principle
that a group of people in the same boat should pull together." The Code of Professional
If certification is economically infeasible, an association may have
to choose between functioning in an undifferentiated market with
high or low average quality. The quasi-rent of professionals as well
as consumer welfare may be greater at the high-quality equilibrium.
The association might therefore privately attempt to ensure the qual-
ity of services offered by the profession generally or, more likely, pe-
tition the government to adopt its conduct restrictions as mandatory
rules of behavior for all professionals. This is the lemon problem first
addressed by private action through conduct restrictions when certi-
fication is impossible."15 In this case, the conduct restrictions of an
association, whether or not ratified or independently adopted by a
government entity, could increase welfare even though they do not
serve to distinguish association members from other professionals.
If a state does adopt the association's restrictions as rules for li-
censure, or even for government certification, the association will not
necessarily abandon them. The association might even adopt com-
mon law rules as its own. An association may be the most effective
enforcer of these mandates. If certification is effectively impossible,
the association may nevertheless have an interest in raising the qual-
ity of services provided in the market. If certification is feasible, the
association's interest may be stronger. For example, though profes-
sionals may be prohibited from having conflicts of interests by the
common law, statute, or administrative regulation, some profession-
als will undoubtedly violate the prohibition. An association may pro-
vide consumers with valuable information by in effect certifying that
its members obey the law. In a market of suppliers that contains an
array of quality, an association may usefully distinguish itself even
when providing low quality services is illegal. The association would
become irrelevant only if compliance with the law were perfect.11
Practice of the American Society of Landscape Architects, 1962 edition, reprinted in, J.
CLAPP, supra note 18, at 397.
115. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
116. The source of the legal requirement is not, however, economically insignifi-
cant. The capture theory suggests an anticompetitive explanation for legislation and ad-
ministrative regulation - that such government action is procured at the behest of rent-
seeking producers to achieve anticompetitive ends. See authorities cited in note 2, supra.
By contrast, the common law is generally presumed, at least by scholars in the law and
economics movement, to be driven by an intuitive desire to increase efficiency. See, e.g.,
R. POSNER, supra note 7, at 20-22. See generally Rubin, Why Is the Common Law
Efficient, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977); Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selec-
tion of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Goodman, An Economic Theory of
the Evolution of the Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978); R. COOTER & T.
ULEN, supra note 7, at 492-96. If an association enforces a statute or regulation, it may
be attempting to perfect the anticompetitive purpose and effect of the measure. If it
enforces a common law mandate, however, no analogous anticompetitive explanation
exists.
The distinction between the likely effects of government action has led William Page,
in an excellent article, to articulate a theory of state action immunity that distinguishes
between legislative and administrative policies. See Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and
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This analysis does not purport to prove that the eligibility require-
ments and conduct restrictions of professional associations increase
welfare, only to explain why they might. If association members can
charge higher prices solely because compliance with the rules of the
association increases demand, those rules do presumptively increase
welfare. The possibility that rules enhance welfare is not negated if.
the association imposes them through an exercise of unrelated eco-
nomic power or procures government support. Nor is that possibility
negated if the association maintains rules that are embodied in legal
mandates.
V. APPLICATION OF THEORIES TO FACTS
If the effects of any given rule on the costs of supplying services
and the demand for those services could be measured directly with
precision, confidence, and ease, determining candidates for antitrust
condemnation would be simple. Anticompetitive rules cause prices to
rise and output to fall; procompetitive rules typically cause prices
and output to increase or leave both unaffected. Any rule whose net
effect was to reduce welfare would be a target. All that would re-
main to be done to establish an antitrust violation would be to prove
an agreement, identify the parties to it, and then apply the doctrine
of state action immunity. 117 Even a rule that both increased the mar-
ginal costs of supply and increased demand could be judged without
risk of error. A per se rule would be irrelevant, for the errors of
overinclusion implicit in such a rule could not be justified either by
significant savings in litigation costs or by eliminating errors of
underinclusion.
The demand and supply effects of professional rules, however, can
hardly ever be ascertained at trivial cost. Marginal costs are notori-
ously difficult to calculate. Prices can often be observed and demand
can be measured, but the data necessary to determine the effect of a
rule, perhaps decades old, are often unavailable. Because of the
usual difficulty of direct measurement, rational antitrust enforce-
ment may hinge upon identifying principles of analysis that can be
applied at low cost and produce reasonably accurate predictions of
the effects of rules. Several principles are possible, and they lead to
different possible antitrust rules.
State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE
L. J. 618, 632-37 (1987).
117. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act outlaws "[e]very contract, combina-
tion . . ., or conspiracy" in restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
A. Possible Antitrust Rules
1. Categoric illegality
One principle might be that if a single rule of a particular associa-
tion is proven empirically to reduce welfare, all of the rules of that
association would be conclusively presumed to be anticompetitive. In
most cases such a principle would be expensive to apply. A definitive
study of even one rule would likely be substantial. Although it might
reduce the costs of analysis significantly, it would also be misguided.
There is no basis for assuming that all of an association's rules pro-
duce the same effects. Indeed, a typical association has an array of
rules, some of which can be explained by no intelligible anticompeti-
tive theory. Similarly, concluding that all of an association's rules
enhance efficiency because one has been proven to do so would have
little better justification. Such a principle would create an incentive
for an association with market power to surround an anticompetitive
restraint with welfare-enhancing rules.
A more promising principle would hold that if a particular rule of
a given association is proven empirically to reduce welfare, that rule
will be conclusively presumed to be anticompetitive when imposed by
any association. That is the essence of the per se rule.1 8 The great
practical benefit of the per se rule is that it abrogates the need to
prove a net reduction of welfare or even of market power. This is not
because per se illegal practices reduce welfare even when the actors
have no market power. Rather, the rule has been justified on the
ground that long experience with a practice can demonstrate that it
is almost always undertaken by actors who have market power and it
decreases welfare.""9 When this is so, a per se rule can reduce the
118. Perhaps the classic statement of the per se rule is contained in Northern Pa-
cific Railway v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958): "[T]here are certain agreements or
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeem-
ing virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their
use."
119. This experiential foundation for the per se rule is best demonstrated by White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). The Court there refused to find verti-
cal customer and territorial restrictions illegal per se. Id. at 263. Referring to the territo-
rial restraints, the Court said:
We do not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these
arrangements emerge to be certain. They may be too dangerous to sanction or
they may be allowable protections against aggressive competitors or the only
practicable means a small company has for breaking into or staying in business
.... We need to know more than we do about the actual impact of these
arrangements on competition to decide whether they have such a "pernicious
effect on competition and lack ... any redeeming virtue" . . . and therefore
should be classified as per se violations of the Sherman Act.
Id. (citations omitted). However, the Court has not consistently cited experience as the
basis for per se illegality. For example, the Court held a boycott illegal per se in Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959), because it interfered with
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costs of litigation and of erroneous failure to impose liability for an-
ticompetitive practices, while creating little risk of overinclusion. 2 °
The premise of the per se rule, is that a given practice has a pre-
dictable anticompetitive effect.121 Practices that constitute explicit or
the "freedom of traders." For an interesting discussion of the bases of the per se rule, see
Krattenmaker, Per Se Violations in Antitrust Law: Confusing Offenses with Defenses, 77
GEO. L. J. 165, 167-70 (1988).
120. In Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association,
110 S. Ct. 768 (1990), the Court articulated a rationale for the per se rule that is mis-
leading, if not wrong. The Court likened antitrust per se rules to per se restrictions on
"stunt flying in congested areas or speeding." Id. at 781. The Court observed that "every
speeder and every stunt pilot poses some threat to the community," and commented, "An
unpredictable event may overwhelm the skills of the best driver or pilot, even when the
proposed course of conduct was entirely prudent when initiated." Id. The Court rea-
soned, "So it is with boycotts and price fixing. Every such horizontal arrangement among
competitors poses some threat to the free market. A small participant in the market is,
obviously, less likely to cause persistent damage than a large participant.... [H]owever,
a small conspirator may be able to impede competition over some period of time. Given
an appropriate set of circumstances and some luck, the period can be long enough to
inflict real injury upon particular consumers or competitors." Id. (footnotes omitted).
If certain conduct can only cause harm, and the only question is how much, per se
condemnation of that conduct can only increase welfare, whether by a lot or a little. The
reference to stunt flying and speeding conjures up colorful images of activities that have
no obvious social benefit. The Court noted that perhaps most violations of laws against
those activities "actually cause no harm" id.; it did not add, "and produce some benefit."
In fact, activities presumably increase the utility of the actors, but that is not an effect
that leaps to mind. By contrast, conduct subsumed in the categories of antitrust per se
illegality do increase welfare. The decision, then, is not whether to condemn automati-
cally activity that is only likely to do a little harm, but whether to condemn activity that
will affirmatively do good. The Court's discussion of the per se rule in Arizona v. Mari-
copa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982), seems to recognize this analysis
and is therefore more ingenuous. See infra note 188. Moreover, the immediacy of the
danger in the context of stunt flying and speeding is simply not comparable to any dan-
ger posed by price fixing given a market structure that prevents an anticompetitive effect.
A child is more likely to wander into the street than ten shoe manufacturers are to exit
the market.
121. The danger in applying a per se rule to the restriction of a professional associ-
ation when the anticompetitive effect of the restriction is unclear from the evidence in the
case and experience elsewhere was nicely summarized by Judge Posner in Vogel v.
American Society of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1984). The case involved a rule
of the American Society of Appraisers that prohibited a member from doing "work for a
fixed percentage of the amount of value.., which he determines at the conclusion of his
work." Id. at 599. Judge Posner wrote:
[T]he novelty of the challenged practice (novel to the courts, that is) is a rea-
son against per se classification.... The attempt to get rid of the fixed-percent-
age appraisal fee may be perniciously anticompetitive in ways that we cannot
perceive from the scanty record before us, but to condemn it before any evi-
dence on its competitive effects has been produced would prevent the courts
from acquiring any information about it. It is difficult enough for judges to
inform themselves about business practices without shutting off the information
flow before it begins, by prematurely adopting a rule of blanket illegality.
Id. at 603-04 (citations omitted).
implicit agreements to charge stipulated prices in excess of marginal
cost, to limit output so that prices rise to that level, or to divide
territories so that each resulting local monopolist charges prices at
that level have been the kind most likely to be condemned per Se.
Logically, however, practices that almost always produce any of the
other anticompetitive effects set out earlier, like an increase in con-
sumer search costs or in the marginal costs of supply, equally war-
rant per se condemnation. As discussed below, the Court has applied
something akin to a per se rule to a practice that at most had such
an effect.
The classic practice that produces the traditional anticompetitive
effect is an agreement among competitors as to specific prices
charged. That kind of an agreement could be, and has been, embod-
ied in the rules of a professional association. The Supreme Court
held such an agreement illegal per se.122 If the universe of contexts
in which price fixing has occurred is considered to be the whole of
economic activity, application of the per se rule might well be effi-
cient.123 After all, the process of defining a category of per se illegal-
122. In United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S.
485, 488 (1950), the Court held that a local real estate board, by adopting standard rates
of commissions and an ethical rule that provided, "Brokers should maintain the standard
rates of commission adopted by the board and no business should be solicited at lower
rates," even though the rule was enforced by no sanction, committed a per se antitrust
violation. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Court held illegal
an agreement embodied in bar association rules to adhere to a fee schedule for common
legal services. However, it is not clear whether the Court found the agreement illegal
under the per se rule or the rule of reason. The Court nowhere used the term "per se." It
did say in a footnote:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a
business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint
violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of profes-
sions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to
apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The
public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a
particular practice, which could properly be viewed a violation of the Sherman
Act in another context, be treated differently. We intimate no view on any
other situation than the one with which we are confronted today.
Id. at 788 n.17 (emphasis added).
In a later case, the Court explained that the footnote meant that "certain practices by
members of a learned profession might survive scrutiny under the Rule of Reason even
though they would be viewed as a [per se] violation of the Sherman Act in another
context." National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 686
(1978). Whether the Court was referring to "certain practices" other than agreements to
charge specified prices or including such agreements is not clear. The best interpretation
is that the Court in Goldfarb found the arrangement illegal under the rule of reason but
that explicit price fixing thereafter was per se illegal. Other practices, however, might be
judged under the rule of reason even though they are illegal in non-professional settings.
123. At times, the Supreme Court has implied that explicit price fixing agreements
will be assessed in relation to the whole of economic activity and not in relation to sub-
categories. For example, in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222
(1940), the Court said that "the Sherman Act, so far as price-fixing agreements are
concerned, establishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries alike." Similarly, in
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ity is the art of deciding what elements of conduct and attributes of
market structure will be ignored. However, if the universe is limited
to professional associations, the justification for the rule is less com-
pelling. Explicit price fixing provisions in association rules are rare.
They were the subject of National Association of Real Estate
Boards, which involved associations of real estate brokers, and Gold-
farb, which involved bar associations, and in both cases the organiza-
tions may have had market power.
The 1922 rules of the American Institute of Architects (hereinaf-
ter "Institute") similarly provided that the "proper minimum
charge" for professional services "is six per cent. ' 124 But the Insti-
tute at the time comprised 30 percent of the profession.125 Whether
that association had market power is doubtful. Market power could
be conferred by state regulation, but there is no reason to suspect
that the six percent rate for architecture services was mandated by
law. Alternatively, suppliers who account for a large percentage of a
properly-defined antitrust market can have the power to raise price.
Thirty percent of a market would fall far short, but that. assumes the
market consisted of all architects.
Defining professional services' markets can be difficult. The Jus-
tice Department Merger Guidelines define a market as
a product or group of products and a geographic area in which it is sold
such that a hypothetical, profit-maximizing firm, not subject to price regu-
lation, that was the only present and future seller of those products in that
area would impose a 'small but significant and nontransitory' increase in
price above prevailing or likely future levels.
1 26
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978), a
case involving a professional association's rule that prohibited competitive bidding, the
Court said, "The early cases ...foreclose the argument that because of the special
characteristics of a particular industry, monopolistic arrangements will better promote
trade and commerce than competition." The Court cited United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), and United States v. Joint Traffic Association,
171 U.S. 505, 573-77 (1898).
Yet in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 101
(1984), the Court refused to apply the per se rule to an agreement that governed the sale
of television rights to college football games, even though the per se rule appeared to be
appropriate under the Court's analysis, because the case involved "an industry in which
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all."
It is probably safe to say that the Court in the last decade has become more willing to
distinguish among industries in applying the per se rule. The limits of that willingness
are not clear.
124. See E. HEERMANCE, supra note 18, at 20.
125. See B. LANDIS, supra note 17, at 13.
126. See Justice Dep't Merger Guidelines, [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1169, at S-1 (June 14, 1984).
The services of members of a given profession are not fungible. It
may be that some segment of a profession could raise price profita-
bly, that is, without causing demand or supply responses that would
thwart the increase, and so that segment would constitute a relevant
antitrust market. 12 7 In the case of the architects, it is possible that
the members of the Institute accounted for a much larger share of a
smaller market, a market comprising less than the whole profession.
Estimates that Institute members did "more than half and perhaps
three-fourths of the architectural business in the country" tend to
support that possibility.128 Of course, non-member architects surely
were at least a looming presence on the fringe of whatever the rele-
vant market was, poised to expand into the market if attracted by
monopoly profits.
If the market embraced all architects, a price increase could not
have had an anticompetitive effect. Consumers would have switched
to non-member architects, who could have increased their output at
little increase in marginal cost. For this reason, any cartel wants to
bring within its scope as large a fraction of the suppliers in a market
as possible. Yet the Institute was criticized by members and non-
members for its exclusivity - for setting up "a small 'clique' within
the profession" through use of "high standards of admission",
thereby failing "to carry along with it the great majority of archi-
tects of the country.' 129
Even an association whose members account for a large share of a
market cannot always increase price with impunity. The participants
in any cartel have a strong incentive to cheat on the agreement. To
sustain anticompetitive prices for an appreciable period of time, the
association would have to be able to detect chiselling, a potentially
nettlesome task in light of the nature of professional services, and it
would need the ability to impose an effective deterrent. If expulsion
from the association is the ultimate sanction, membership in it must
afford a significant commercial advantage. 30 Further, when service
competition cannot be restrained, even an airtight price restriction
will generate little profit, for available rents will quickly be dissi-
pated in the provision of better services.
The Institute may not have had power to raise price above margi-
nal cost. But if that is so, what explains the minimum price rule? It
could be that the rule was not enforced, which in the language of
127. It is also possible, and perhaps more likely, that the antitrust market extends
beyond the boundaries of a traditional profession. For example, a properly defined mar-
ket for psychotherapy may encompass psychologists and psychiatrists.
128. B. LANDIS, supra note 17, at 14.
129. Id.
130. Although the commercial significance of membership in the Institute when
the rule existed is not certain, the Institute was praised for enforcing its rules and main-
taining "a high degree of control within the membership." Id.
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this article would mean that there was in fact no conduct restriction.
Or the rule may have been designed to raise the quality of service
offered in the market. If an association is attempting to certify that
its members provide a higher quality of service than other profes-
sionals offer, it may establish stringent eligibility requirements and
impose specific conduct restrictions that induce high quality behav-
ior. However, it might also prescribe a price above the prevailing
level and expect, indeed rely on the fact, that members will compete
to raise the level of service provided. To induce additional services, a
manufacturer may impose resale price maintenance rather than
specify contractually the services that a retailer must render when
retailers can more efficiently determine the exact services consumers
value most highly. Analogously, an association might conclude that
many elements of professional conduct which affect value are better
determined individually than collectively. In the language of Addys-
ton Pipe' and BMI, 3 2 such a price restriction would be ancillary to
the integration of economic function's implicit in quality certification
and therefore subject to a rule of reason.
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States 33
the Court considered a rule of an engineers' association that prohib-
ited members from soliciting or submitting proposals on the basis of
competitive bidding.134 The association defined competitive bidding
as the submission or receipt of estimates of cost or proposals
"whereby the prospective client may compare engineering services on
a price basis prior to the time that one engineer . . . has been se-
lected for negotiations."1 35 The case did not involve any claim that
the National Society of Professional Engineers (hereinafter "Soci-
ety") "tried to fix specific fees, or even a specific method of calculat-
ing fees."1 36 Rather, the rule prevented members from discussing
fees "until after a prospective client has selected the engineer for a
particular project. '137 If negotiations with the chosen engineer were
unsuccessful, the client was free to "withdraw his selection and ap-
proach a new engineer."' 38
131. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), mod-
ified and afl'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
132. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
133. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
134. Id. at 683 n.3.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 682.
137. Id. at 682-83.
138. Id. at 684 n.6 (citing the district court's opinion at 389 F. Supp. 1193, 1215
(D.D.C. 1974)).
The kind of rule adopted by the Society does not constitute an
agreement to charge specified prices or reduce output, It is not an
agreement to rig bids - an allocation of bidding territories among
competitors with the understanding that the bidder selected by the
cartel will submit the low estimate and other participants will submit
higher proposals. That kind of an agreement effectively creates a lo-
cal monopoly for each member. Any of these practices would follow
the cartel pricing explanation of anticompetitive effects.
Rather, the most plausible anticompetitive explanation for a rule
like the Society's is that it increased consumer search costs. Mem-
bers were free to set any prices they wished, but consumers were
forced to negotiate with a single firm before they could discover an-
other firm's price. The resulting sequential and laborious price
search may have led consumers with high opportunity costs for their
.time to accept the first fee proposal, or at least an early bid. That
would have led to a market structure that resembled monopolistic
competition, with each firm charging a price determined by marginal
revenue but earning no monopoly profits.139 Alternatively, that kind
of rule might be explained as a device to increase the incremental
costs of supply. If submitting bids in competition with other bids is
the most efficient way to increase output, a restriction on competitive
bidding would increase the elasticity of supply in the industry. Price
would be set at marginal cost, but marginal cost would be higher
when demand is satisfied than it would otherwise be.140
The Court concluded, "On its face, this agreement restrains trade
within the meaning of § 1 of the Sherman Act. '141 It went on to
consider as an affirmative defense the Society's argument that "the
restraint is justified because bidding on engineering services is inher-
ently imprecise, would lead to deceptively low bids, and would
thereby tempt individual engineers .to do inferior work with conse-
quent risk to public safety and health. 1 42 The Society also argued
that competitive bidding would create "pressure to offer engineering
services at the lowest possible price[, which] would adversely affect
the quality of engineering.' 4 The Court held that the defense was
not cognizable under the Sherman Act and so could not save the
practice under the rule of reason.14 4 In essence, the court analyzed
the Society's regulation under the rule of reason and held that the
Society's defense was per se inadmissible.1 4 The Court did not say
139. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
141. Professional Engineers, 435 'U.S. at 693.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 685.
144. Id. at 696.
145. This interpretation is consistent with Professor Krattenmaker's explanation of
the way in which the per se concept should be understood. See Krattenmaker, supra note
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that the restriction could never be justified, but that the defense of-
fered for it would automatically be rejected. At least in theory, the
practice could be upheld if a different and legally adequate justifica-
tion was offered.
The Court's treatment of the Society's proffered defense is unfor-
tunate. There is no reason to believe that Congress intended to out-
law practices that increase consumer welfare, or for that matter, eco-
nomic welfare.146 Despite the Court's language, a better explanation
for the decision might be that the Court did not clearly understand
how the rule could increase welfare and therefore did not believe
that it could. In fact, the Court probably had only a hazy view of the
anticompetitive theory of the rule. The restriction undoubtedly
looked more like restraints that had been condemned than agree-
ments that had been blessed. An agreement among competitors that
has a clear potential to inhibit rivalry is easy to outlaw when the
efficiency-enhancing potential of it is mere smoke puffed from the
cigars of the culprits. In other words, the harder it is to see some-
thing good in a practice, the worse the practice looks.
Although the Society's rule, on its face, comfortably fits one or
two anticompetitive theories, it is far from clear that the rule had an
anticompetitive effect. The Society accounted for slightly less than
119. He points out that describing offenses as per se illegal is misleading:
[W]e have confused offenses with defenses. What the Court means to say is
that certain defenses or justifications frequently offered for price fixing (or
group boycotts, or tying arrangements) are to be summarily rejected, without
factual inquiry, either as a matter of principle or because experience teaches us
that the costs of the inquiry will exceed any potential gains. No conduct is per
se (that is, "by itself" or "intrinsically") a violation of the antitrust laws. How-
ever, certain defenses to such conduct are per se inadmissible or impermissible.
Id. at 172-73 (footnotes omitted).
146. This does not mean that the concept of a legally incognizable defense is inap-
propriate, only that it was largely misapplied here. If a group of firms argue that their
pricefixing should be excused because they donate the monopoly profits from it to the
United Way, their defense should be summarily rejected. The firms should not even be
allowed to prove their assertions. Unlike a claim that an agreement on balance increases
economic welfare in a single market, or even one that an agreement inescapably de-
creases economic welfare in one market but increases welfare in another by a greater
amount, the asserted defense has nothing to do with the purpose of the antitrust laws,
whether or not society would be better off because of the arrangement. Similarly, one
could characterize Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Associa-
tion, I10 S. Ct. 768 (1990), as a case in which the Court correctly per se rejected a
defense. There, a group of criminal lawyers in private practice, who regularly accepted
assignments to represent indigent defendants for fees set and paid by the District of
Columbia, refused to accept new cases unless the fees were increased. Id. at 771-72. The
Court summarily rejected the defense that the expressive purpose of the agreement to
demand higher prices justified the conduct. Id. 778-82.
10 percent of all engineers in the country holding a college engineer-
ing degree.147 It accounted for approximately 17 percent of all engi-
neers licensed to practice by a state.1 48 And it accounted for less
than 7.5 percent of the consulting engineers in the country, those
licensed engineers who offer their services directly to the public.1 49
The Society may have had economic power in a market defined more
narrowly than any of these figures suggest. But it appears that the
Society had no market power by virtue of the number of its mem-
bers, and no claim was made that competitive bidding was prohib-
ited by law. If the Society had no market power, its rule could have
had no anticompetitive effect.
The distinct possibility that the rule had no anticompetitive effect
raises the question of whether there is an alternative explanation for
the rule. The Society argued that it never enforced its ban,150 but the
district court found otherwise.15 Still, as evidence of enforcement,
the district court referred to "direct and indirect communication
with members and prospective clients.' 52 It cited "educational cam-
paigns and personal admonitions to members and clients who were
suspected of engaging in competitive bidding," 53 but noted no in-
stance in which a member was disciplined by expulsion or otherwise
for engaging in the practice. That kind of "enforcement" is weak
indeed; the rule may in fact have never restrained behavior, regard-
less of what the Society might have intended it to do.
However, assuming the rule was effective, and surely it was in-
tended to do something, the explanation for it probably lies in the
quality certification theory of professional rules. The Society groped
for a quality-enhancing explanation in its argument before the Su-
preme Court, though it did not fully grasp the concept, and its refer-
ence to saving the public welfare was misleading.15 4 Consumers were
presumably free to solicit multiple simultaneous bids from non-mem-
ber engineers, who were not bound by the rule. It is not clear
whether a member had to withdraw his proposal if a bid was solic-
147. See United States v. Nat'l Soc'y of Professional Eng'r, 389 F. Supp. 1193,
1195 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 1031 (1975), affd in part & modified in part,
555 F.2d 978 (1977), affid, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
148. Id.
149. See id. at 1195 (approximately half of the 325,000 licensed engineers in the
country, or 162,500, were consulting engineers); Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 682
(12,000 of the Society's members were consulting engineers).
150. Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 684 n.5.
151. Professional Engineers, 389 F. Supp. at 1200.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. When a private rule is not adopted by law, and the association accounts for a
small percentage of the profession, even a quality-enhancing rule can be ignored by non-
members. A ban on competitive bidding conceivably could protect the public welfare
given informational asymmetries, but not if it applies only to a small proportion of the
suppliers in the market.
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ited from a non-member, as opposed to a member, but in any event,
only one member's proposal could be considered by a potential client
at any one time. If the Society had developed a reputation for qual-
ity, clients might have found non-members a poor substitute. But
then to force Society members to compete with each other, and
thereby to lower the price and quality of the services they offered
because of the consumer's informational disadvantage, would have
destroyed the value of the certification and forced consumers to incur
higher search costs to find the quality of professional they desired,
assuming services of that quality would continue to have been of-
fered in the market. Surely the antitrust laws were not designed to
work that result.
The Supreme Court alluded to the figures suggesting that the So-
ciety lacked market power, but it did not seem to digest their signifi-
cance. Perhaps if the Court had considered the improbability of an
anticompetitive effect flowing from a rule of an association repre-
senting such a small share of the profession, it would have listened
more carefully to the Society's defense. At least it might have been
less hostile to the argument, even if it had reached the same result.
Suppose that the Society adopted the competitive bidding rule
along with its other ethical mandates when it accounted for 10 per-
cent of the narrowest properly defined antitrust market, and that it
grew to encompass 90 percent. The rule would then represent an
agreement among firms with market power. This raises the question
of whether the rule then reduces welfare. Conduct restrictions can,
increase quality and enhance welfare whether or not maintained by
firms with market power.' 55 When an association without market
power imposes conduct restrictions and grows to possess that power,
the question is: Did the association grow because of the restriction
and others like it, or did it grow for unrelated reasons? The answer
to that question will often be unclear. But when no alternative and
persuasive reason for the association's growth is evident, the most
plausible inference is that market power is the product of demand-
increasing restrictions. Condemning the restrictions would reduce
welfare.
Advertising restraints are particularly susceptible to summary
condemnation on the ground that an anticompetitive explanation ex-
ists for them and they have been empirically proven to reduce wel-
fare in a professional services market. As discussed earlier, an adver-
155. See supra notes 88-116 and accompanying text.
tising restriction has been used as a prime example of a device that
increases consumer search costs and the incremental costs of supply.
Moreover, it is one of the rare restraints that has been studied em-
pirically in a professional setting.
Studies of optometric product and service markets concluded that
advertising restrictions increased prices, 1 6 and increased prices with-
out increasing quality. 157 In particular, the Bureau of Economics of
the Federal Trade Commission conducted an experiment to assess
the effects on price and quality of advertising restraints.'6 8 Nineteen
subjects with "relatively routine visual problems"'' 9 were sent to va-
rious cities to obtain eye examinations and eyeglasses from optome-
trists. In some cities, some optometrists advertised, and these cities
were labelled, "nonrestrictive"; in other cities, virtually no advertis-
ing was observed, and they were labelled, "restrictive."' 6 The qual-
ity of the services received was then evaluated along four dimensions:
"(1) thoroughness of the eye examination; (2) accuracy of the pre-
scription; (3) accuracy and workmanship of the resulting eyeglasses;
and (4) extent of unnecessary prescribing."''
Manifestly, the dimensions of quality used were limited and did
not permit a direct evaluation of other important elements of service.
For example, the methodology did not permit a direct assessment of
whether subjects with unusual visual problems would have received
the same diagnoses from advertising and non-advertising optome-
trists. Moreover, the quality dimensions studied were necessarily ob-
jective measures. If consumers placed any subjective valuation on re-
ceiving services from an optometrist who did not advertise, and they
may well not have, this study could not have reflected that value.
The concept of quality used in this Article embraces any such sub-
jective value.
Nevertheless, the study concluded that on three of four dimensions
- accuracy of prescription, quality of eyeglasses, and unnecessary
prescriptions - advertising optometrists performed no worse than
non-advertising practitioners. 16 2 The examinations given by advertis-
ing optometrists were less thorough than those given by non-advertis-
156. See Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J. L. &
ECON. 337 (1972).
157. See R. Bond, J. Kwoka, Jr., J. Phelan & I. Whitten, Effects of Restrictions
on Advertising and Commercial Practice in the Professions: The Case of Optometry
[hereinafter FTC Report]; Kwoka, Advertising and the Price and Quality of Optometric
Services, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 211 (1984). The Kwoka paper is based on the data col-
lected in the FTC Report. See id. at 212. Therefore, any methodological problems inher-
ent in the FTC Report would carry over to the Kwoka study.
158. See FTC Report, supra note 157.
159. Id. at 7.
160. See id. at 2.
161. Id. at 6.
162. See id. at 14, 20.
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ers in the same geographic market.163 However, the percentage of
optometrists who gave deficient examinations was about the same in
restrictive and nonrestrictive cities.6 Prices for the same services
were higher in restrictive cities than in nonrestrictive cities. 165 In
nonrestrictive cities, nonadvertising optometrists gave more thorough
examinations and charged higher prices than advertising
optometrists. 68
The FTC Report did not attempt to explain why advertising failed
to occur in the nonrestrictive cities.'67 It merely commented gener-
ally that advertising restrictions "are imposed by licensing boards,
state law, or private professional organizations through canons of
ethics."' 68 However, the national association for the. profession se-
verely limited advertising. 6" Given that advertising did occur in
some cities, the source of the advertising restraints in restrictive cit-
ies presumably was the government. Indeed, the advertisers in nonre-
strictive cities presumably did not belong to the association. If the
nonadvertisers in those cities did belong to the association and pro-
vided more thorough examinations at a higher price, the certification
function may have been operating well.
Therefore, these studies may stand for the proposition that adver-
tising restraints imposed by law on optometrists reduce welfare.'70
However, they provide little or no support for condemning per se all
association rules that limit advertising.' 7' Though some other profes-
163. See id. at 13-14.
164. See id. at 13.
165. See id. at 25.
166. See id.
167. The problems posed by the methodology used in the FTC Report to classify
geographic markets as restrictive or nonrestrictive are discussed in Haas-Wilson, The
Effect of Commercial Practice Restrictions: The Case of Optometry, 29 J. L. & ECON.
165, 166-68 (1986).
168. FTC Report, supra note 157, at Executive Summary 1.
169. See E. HEERMANCE, supra note 18, at 398-99; J. CLAPP, supra note i8, at
515.
170. The FTC Report was preceded by a trade regulation rule the FTC promul-
gated in 1978. The Trade Regulation Rule on the Advertising of Ophthalmic Goods and
Services, or "Eyeglasses I", codified at 16 C.F.R. § 456, prohibited bans on nondeceptive
advertising and required vision care providers to furnish copies of prescriptions to con-
sumers after eye exams. The circuit court upheld the prescription release requirement
but remanded the advertising part of the regulation for reconsideration in light of Bates
v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). American Optometric Ass'n v. FTC, 626
F.2d 896 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
171. The strongest argument that advertising restrictions reduce economic welfare
pertains to government-imposed restraints, but these restraints will often be protected
from antitrust scrutiny by the state action doctrine. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943). That doctrine protects any advertising prohibition imposed by a legislature (see
371
sions undoubtedly are indistinguishable from optometry in relevant
economic respects, some surely are distinguishable. In particular, the
magnitude of the informational asymmetry and the idiosyncratic
value consumers place on advertising may vary across professions.
Moreover, the studies do not purport to show that welfare suffers
when an association imposes advertising restrictions that are not
adopted by the state (or perhaps when the association otherwise
lacks economic power). Indeed, the studies imply that associations
with no market power sometimes adopt private restraints; there is
also a considerable amount of suggestive evidence to the same effect.
A host of professional associations, from the American Association
of Marriage and Family Counselors 17 1 to the American Physical
Therapy Association,' 73 have restricted advertising.174 Advertising
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1984)) or, in the
case of attorneys, by a state supreme court (see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S.
350 (1977)). If imposed by a state regulatory agency, the ban would be protected if it is
consistent with a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed legislative policy and the
policy is actively supervised by the agency. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980). In particular, an advertising restraint adopted
by a regulatory agency with an inadequate legislative mandate would not be protected.
For a discussion of the clear legislative policy requirement, see Lopatka, The State of
"State Action" Antitrust Immunity: A Progress Report, 46 LA. L. REV. 941, 995-1002
(1986).
However, state laws prohibiting advertising are no longer a major concern. In Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770(1976), the Court held that a state could not ban price advertising by pharmacists consis-
tent with the first amendment though it could regulate it in other ways. In Bates, the
Court extended the constitutional holding of Virginia Pharmacy to advertising by attor-
neys. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384. Ironically, then, the most serious potential instances of
anticompetitive harm flowing from advertising restraints are off-limits to antitrust en-
forcement, but they are nevertheless infirm under the constitution. Antitrust enforcement
is confined to restraints that are not likely to offend antitrust principles.
172. See J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at 431.
173. See id. at 562.
174. Other associations that adopted stringent restrictions on advertising include
the following: American Dental Association, reported in E. HEERMANCE, supra note 18,
at 143, J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at 228; American Bar Association, E. HEERMIANCE,
supra note 18, at 286; American Veterinary Medical Association, id. at 519; American
Institute of Accountants, id. at 6; American Arbitration Association, J. CLAPP, supra
note 18, at 80; National Society of Professional Engineers, id. at 253; International Bar
Association, id. at 414; American Pharmaceutical Association, id. at 550; American
Speech and Hearing Association, id. at 743.
Some associations adopted rules that prohibit undignified or self-laudatory advertising,
and those rules could have been enforced more or less strictly; e.g., the codes of the
following associations: American Society of Heating and Ventilating Engineers, Ameri-
can Society of Mechanical Engineers, and Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engi-
neers, reported in E. HEERMANCE, supra note 18, at 163; American Institute of Consult-
ing Engineers, id. at 166; Photographers' Association of America, id. at 431; National
Funeral Directors Association of the United States, id. at 516; Society of Actuaries, J.
CLAPP, supra note 18, at 26; Engineers' Council for Professional Development, id. at
248; American Society of Landscape Architects, id. at 399; American Congress on Sur-
veying and Mapping, id. at 748.
Some associations prohibit false or misleading advertising. If enforced according to its
terms, of course, such a restriction would not even arguably serve an anticompetitive
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restraints appear to be a common feature of British professional as-
sociations.17 5 It is simply inconceivable that all of the associations
that have restrained advertising had market power, whether derived
from state law or unrelated economic sources.
An association might adopt a restraint hoping that someday it will
have market power, that the restraint will then increase rents an-
ticompetitively, and that the restraint will have no adverse impact on
its members in the meantime. But the adoption of the rule by several
of these associations suggest that the restraint has a different pur-
pose and, more importantly, a different effect. For example, the
American Osteopathic Association banned advertising,'17 6 and the
members of that association presumably competed with and consti-
tuted a much smaller share of the market than physicians. Just as a
member of an association that imposes an anticompetitive restraint
has an incentive to cheat, non-members can profit by engaging in the
restrained practice. Osteopaths as a group presumably stood to gain
by advertising when physicians were not 177 if the advertising merely
increased the incremental costs of supply. Of course in the long run,
all suppliers will benefit if they all adhere to the restriction, but this
is merely to recognize that competition can impose negative exter-
nalities on rivals. Cheating on any cartel will ultimately harm the
economic interests of the cheater, but that does not stop chiseling.
Even if state law prohibited osteopaths from advertising, the society
would not be expected to endorse the prohibition. 7
purpose and would potentially serve a welfare-enhancing one. See, e.g., the codes of the
following: National Hairdressers Association, E. HEERMANCE, supra note 18, at 221;
Board for Certification of Genealogists, J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at 322; Guild of Pre-
scription Opticians of America, id. at 507.
175. See, e.g., A CARR-SAUNDERS & P. WILSON, THE PROFESSIONS 517-18, 522,
526 (1933) (The Warning Notice of the General Medical Council and the report of
enforcement activities of the Council, and the Code of Professional Practice of the
R.I.B.A).
176. See E. HEERMANCE, supra note 18, at 350.
177. The American Medical Association long restricted advertising. See B. LAN-
DIS, supra note 17, at 41, 46; C. TAEUSCH, supra note 11, at 186-89; E. HEERMANCE,
supra note 18, at 339.
178. Similar questions are raised by the advertising restrictions adopted by the
American Podiatry Association whose members compete with orthopedists see J. CLAPP,
supra note 18, at 593; the American Psychological Association whose members compete
with psychiatrists, id. at 630; the American Chiropractic Association, whose members
compete with physicians, id. at 160; and even the American Optometric Association
whose members compete with ophthalmologists, see E. HEERMANCE, supra note 18, at
398-400. The services of each professional in an identified pair certainly are not perfect
substitutes, and whether they should be included in the same market is by no means
clear. Moreover, which of the two professions is dominant even if they are in the same
market is not clear. Yet, inter-profession competition exists to some degree, and the an-
Further, though an advertising ban can have an anticompetitive
effect, advertising inherently tends to increase public awareness of a
service and to stimulate demand. That effect may, be insignificant
with respect to some professional services, but not others. If a profes-
sion is little known, it would most likely have more to gain by in-
creasing demand through advertising than by working an anticompe-
titive result through an advertising restriction. If that kind of
association imposes a ban, the strongest inference is that the restric-
tion serves some demand-increasing function that overshadows the
tendency of advertising to stimulate demand by informing the public
of available services .17 For example, the Society For Clinical and
Experimental Hypnosis, Inc., severely restrained advertising,180 even
though consumers probably have only a passing awareness of the
availability and uses of hypnosis.181 If such an association loses prof-
its by not advertising, even when it has market power in a small
market, it could not impose the restraint without costs while it
waited to acquire market power. In other words, associations with no
market power are more likely to acquire it by advertising than by
not advertising. 182
ticompetitive theories for advertising restraints do not persuasively explain why the mem-
bers of both competing professions would restrict themselves.
179. The 1970 Standards of Professional Advertising Practice of the Society of
Real Estate Appraisers suggest this dynamic. See J. CLAPP, supra note 18, at 72. They
provide:
The appraisal profession is young and the general public is not fully aware of
the importance of the role of the professional appraiser.... [U]ntil this public
awareness and recognition comes into being, the Society realizes that in many
instances it is essential for its members to advertise their professional attain-
ment and services within certain limitation. The Society has therefore estab-
lished . . . standards of professional advertising practices ...Id.
The Society proceeded to adopt extensive advertising restraints. See id. at 72-76.
180. See id. at 365.
181. The obvious demand-enhancing potential of an advertising ban in the case of
the hypnotists is a recognition that consumers would view advertising hypnotists as
quacks and charlatans. A similar concern might underlie the advertising restriction im-
posed by the American Chiropractic Association. See id. at 160-61.
182. Limited empirical analysis has been conducted on some restrictions besides an
advertising restraint. The FTC study purported to include restrictions on the employment
of optometrists by nonprofessional corporations, the permissible location of optometrists'
offices, the operation of multiple offices, and the use of trade names by optometrists em-
ployed by nonprofessional corporations. See FTC Report, supra note 157, at Executive
Summary 1. That Report formed part of the foundation for a second trade regulation
rule promulgated by the FTC in the area of ophthalmic services. The "Eyeglasses II"
Rule prohibited states and local governmental entities from imposing various restrictions
on commercial practices by suppliers of these services. See Trade Regulation Rules;
Opthalmic Practice Rules, 54 Fed. Reg. 10,285 (1989) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. §
456). The Commission's rule was vacated by the circuit court on the ground that, under
state action principles, the rule impermissibly applied to state policies. See California
State Bd. of Optometry v. FTC, 910 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1990). A similar study of so-
called commercial practice restrictions was reported in Benham & Benham, Regulating
through the Professions: A Perspective on Information Control, 18 J. L. & EcoN. 421,
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Application of a per se rule to professional rules, at least to the
great bulk of them, is not supported - not by theory, not by sugges-
tive evidence, not by empirical analysis. Although this may change,
antitrust doctrine is tethered to human knowledge. The traditional
alternative to the per se rule is the rule of reason, which requires
proof that the net effect of the subject restraint is a reduction in
economic welfare.18 3 Many lower courts have held that the first step
of rule of reason analysis is proof that the defendant or defendants
possessed market power, 4 and that requires definition of a relevant
product and geographic market.
2. Mass. Board review
Principally to avoid the burden of proving market power, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission in recent years has used an analysis some-
where between the per se rule and its conception of the rule of rea-
son.""5 Called the "Mass. Board" approach after the name of the
case in which the FTC first articulated the analysis, it asks a series
of three questions: "First, we ask whether the restraint is 'inherently
suspect.' In other words, is the practice the kind that appears likely,
424-25 (1975). The methodology used in both studies obscures the source of the restric-
tions and therefore makes them of little use in forming an appropriate antitrust rule. See
Haas-Wilson, supra note 167, at 166-68. Haas-Wilson attempted to cure the method-
ological problem by explicitly studying the effects of commercial practice restrictions im-
posed by state law on optometrists, using the FTC data. See id. at 168, 168 n.13. Her
study, therefore, was not intended to and does not support application of a per se rule to
commercial practice restrictions adopted exclusively by a private association. Further, all
three studies pertain solely to optometry.
Some other professional services markets have also been the subjects of empirical
study. See, e.g., Schroeter, Smith & Cox, Advertising and Competition in Routine Legal
Service Markets: An Empirical Investigation, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 49 (1987).
183. See, e.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85
(1984) (Under either the per se rule or the rule of reason, the essential inquiry is the
same - whether the challenged restraint enhances competition).
184. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 221
(D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987); Ball- Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mu-
tual Hosp. Ins., 784 F.2d 1325, 1334 (7th Cir. 1986); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City
Enter., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th Cir. 1985); Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp.,
752 F.2d 261, 265 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 1018 (1985); General
Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 1984);
White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 500-04 (6th Cir.
1983); Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1568-72 (11th Cir.
1983); Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1981); Cowley
v. Braden Indus., Inc., 613 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965
(1980).
185. See In re Massachusetts Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549
(1988).
absent an efficiency justification, 'to restrict competition and de-
crease output'?" If not, "the traditional rule of reason, with attend-
ant issues of market definition and power, must be employed." If the
restraint is inherently suspect, the second question is asked: "Is there
a plausible efficiency justification for the practice?" If no such justi-
fication exists, the restraint is condemned. Otherwise, the analysis
proceeds to the third question: Is the justification "really valid"? If
so, the restraint is analyzed under the rule of reason; if not, it is
condemned without further inquiry. 86
The Mass. Board approach is like an eclair without custard - it
looks good, even tastes good, but something is missing. First of all,
no one has yet been able to describe with anything approaching pre-
cision what "inherently suspect" means. Some who apply the analy-
sis define it expansively to refer to an agreement that restricts a sig-
nificant element of rivalry among competitors. Others interpret it
more narrowly to refer to a practice for which there exists a persua-
sive theory of an anticompetitive outcome, supported by some credi-
ble evidence. 18 7 The inherent fuzziness of the term invites inordinate
effort simply to determine whether the analysis is triggered. But that
is not the major shortcoming of the Mass. Board approach.
The inherently suspect category of restraints could be read to be
coextensive with the per se illegal category. In that case, only a few
practices would survive the first step, and as to those, potential de-
fenses which would not be considered at all under traditional per se
analysis, would be recognized. That might be good policy, even if it
would also be inconsistent with some Supreme Court precedents. 188
But that is clearly not what the FTC had in mind. Rather, the anal-
ysis was intended to apply to a broader universe of conduct, though
just how broad is debatable. The implication of the analysis is that
competitively ambiguous conduct is called into question, and the de-
186. Id. at 604.
187. See Langenfeld & Morris, Analyzing Agreements, supra note 16; Langenfeld,
Antitrust Enforcement: The Gray Area of Agreements Among Competitors 13-21,
presented at the CATO Institute Conference, Washington, D.C., April 11, 1990.
188. In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), the
Court explained that a per se rule is expected to condemn a practice in some instances in
which it has a procompetitive effect: "As in every rule of general application, the match
between the presumed and actual is imperfect. For the sake of business certainty and
litigation efficiency, we have tolerated the invalidation of some agreements that fullblown
inquiry might have proved to be reasonable." Id. at 344. The Court cited, inter alia,
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972), a case in which a horizontal
territorial division among grocery stores, which had no market power, undertaken for a
plainly procompetitive purpose, was nevertheless condemned per se. Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y at 344 n.16. The Court, therefore, was recognizing that the per se
rule will condemn certain practices even when a procompetitive justification is compel-
ling. To that extent, the rationale is flatly inconsistent with Mass. Board analysis, which
is intended to permit every actual instance of a practice that produces procompetitive
effects.
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fendants are forced to justify it. Further, the defendants must affirm-
atively justify it, not merely prove that they have no market power
and rely upon the inference that the conduct therefore cannot have
an anticompetitive effect. The FTC believed that the chief virtue of
the Mass. Board approach was that it allowed inherently suspect
practices to be condemned without any inquiry into market power.
For that reason, none of the first three steps of the analysis - iden-
tification of inherently suspect conduct, of a procompetitive theory,
and of supporting evidence - can be read to allow the submission of
evidence regarding and consideration of market power. 189
If defendants could always and easily articulate and support a
procompetitive rationale for conduct that was not anticompetitive,
the analysis would be harmless. Of course, competitively neutral con-
duct would be condemned because, by definition, such conduct has
no procompetitive justification. However, the associated economic
welfare loss, would be relatively small. Although enforcement re-
sources would be consumed needlessly, the underlying conduct out-
lawed would not have increased welfare any activities will survive
the analysis because the efficiency-enhancing theory will be obvious
and the effect self-evident. 190
The approach poses a more subtle danger. Defendants will usually
be able to describe what they do, and they may be able to explain
generally why they do it, but they will often be unable to identify all
of the effects it has or to articulate why it has those effects. Defend-
ants may know that arbitrating disputes is good business, but they
may not be able to describe in economic terms why that is so. In the
end, the insidious effect of the Mass. Board approach is to stifle the
opportunity for firms to experiment With business practices. And the
harm emanating from implicit or explicit legal impediments to effi-
189. To the extent that Mass. Board precludes an inquiry into market power with
respect to conduct that does not fit a traditional per se category, the analysis is the
mirror image of that adopted by those lower courts that require a showing of market
power regarding conduct that is not per se illegal. See supra note 184 and the accompa-
nying text.
190. The Mass. Board approach can be understood to mean that a practice is not
justified by a plausible efficiency unless it is the least restrictive means of achieving the
efficiency. See Langenfeld & Morris, Analyzing Agreements, supra note 16, at 30. The
"less restrictive alternative" inquiry is fine in theory and often useless in practice. A
practice that is less restrictive of competition than another may also be a less efficient
means of reaching a desired result. It is only preferable to the one chosen if it would have
a net positive impact on welfare relative to the first. But that conclusion will rarely be
demonstrable. If the association is not apt to be able to offer a clear explanation for the
rule it adopted, it will hardly be able to explain why some other rule would have been
less successful. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 8-9.
cient practices, because legal barriers are relatively permanent, will
usually exceed the damage caused by inefficient private conduct, be-
cause the market tends to be self-correcting over time.191
The danger to economic creativity, or the loss of efficiency-enhanc-
ing activities that are deterred by using the Mass. Board approach,
could be justified by some countervailing benefit. If opening the in-
quiry to encompass market power was sufficiently costly, the case
would be made. The costs of the inquiry are usually considered to be
the resources expended in assessing market power and the costs of
erroneous determinations of legal validity. The litigation costs de-
pend upon the way in which market power is incorporated into the
analysis. Costs incurred voluntarily are largely an irrelevant policy
concern. Thus, if defendants were allowed to assert the absence of
market power as a defense, the costs the defendants would incur are
unimportant. They would choose to incur those costs only if the mar-
ket power defense was less expensive to establish than a procompeti-
tive justification. Therefore, permitting the defense could only lower
the defendants' litigation costs.
Rather, any concern would relate the plaintiff's costs incurred in
refuting the defense and the tribunal's costs in resolving the dispute.
If the burden of persuasion is on the defendant, and the claim is
specious, the external costs imposed by the defendant's assertion on
the other economic actors involved will be insignificant. The plaintiff
will not have to respond, and the tribunal will be able to conclude
simply that the defendants' burden was not met. The external costs
will be significant only if the defense is serious, only if the defend-
ants' have submitted enough evidence of a lack of market power that
they would win summary judgment. In that case, the risk that fail-
ure to examine market power will result in condemnation of benefi-
cial conduct will be substantial.1 92
An inquiry into market power could only increase the risk that
deleterious practices will escape condemnation to the extent that de-
fendants may have market power but the plaintiff is unable to dis-
prove it. An accurate determination that defendants lack market
power cannot possibly lead to an erroneous acquittal. Market power
analysis may be expensive, and it will not always be correctly re-
solved, but it will certainly be resolved correctly more often than not.
191. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 5-7.
192. If the plaintiff were required to prove the possession of market power as an
element of its case, the involuntary costs would be greater. The plaintiff would have to
incur the associated litigation costs even when the defendant has market power, regard-
less of the amount of expense. Of course, the magnitude of those costs will depend upon
the context of the inquiry and the standard to which the plaintiff is held. The less clear it
is that the defendants have market power, the more expensive the showing will be. How-
ever, the costs may still be justified if the requirement sufficiently reduces legal errors of
overinclusion and the associated effects on the economy.
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If this were not true, the country's merger policy would be a long-
standing and cruel joke. Merger analysis begins with and turns upon
market power analysis, and its results are deemed sufficiently relia-
ble to shape the structure of the economy. Therefore, on balance, a
market power inquiry would necessarily reduce the costs of legal
error.
Thus, if market power analysis is to be precluded, the reason must
be that the resources consumed in making the inquiry are great, the
reduction in legal errors the inquiry brings about is small, and the
loss to the economy associated with overdeterrence is insubstantial.
However, these conclusions are not substantiated. The resource com-
mitment will not always or even usually be large, the reduction in
legal errors may be pronounced, and the economic burden of
overdeterrence is heavy.
3. Flexible rule of reason
Rejection of the per se rule and the Mass. Board approach calls
for consideration of some alternative principle for judging association
rules. The likely candidate is the rule of reason. However, applica-
tion of that rule does not necessarily require the rigid analysis that
the FTC and some lower courts have attributed to it. Rather, what is
emerging today is a "flexible rule of reason." Essentially, as it is
applied in practice, the rule of reason is a function of three variables:
the strength of the anticompetitive story, the strength of any
procompetitive story, and the presence or absence of market power.
Market power could be imported into either or both of the first two
elements, but it is more convenient to treat it separately. The
strength of the story refers to the persuasiveness of the identified
theory and the weight of the supporting evidence. This means that a
theory predicting how a practice of the type involved could produce
a particular effect must be articulated clearly and evidence must be
adduced that bears upon the effect of the practice in the context in
which it is challenged. To the extent that a practice has been proven
empirically to produce certain effects in some market, the theory
that the practice will have analogous effects in the relevant market
becomes more powerful, but it still must be supported by the weight
of the evidence. For example, a plausible anticompetitive theory, for
which there is a little supporting evidence and a little contradictory
evidence, tells a weak story.
Conduct cannot properly be condemned under the rule of reason
unless there is, at a minimum, an articulate anticompetitive story.
379
That principle is simply a recognition that the antitrust laws con-
demn anticompetitive practices, rather than practices that are not
procompetitive. This means that the plaintiff bears the ultimate bur-
den of persuasion. The strength of the story necessary to satisfy that
burden depends upon the strength of any competing procompetitive
story and evidence that bears upon market power. If the anticompe-
titive story is strong, and the procompetitive story is weak, the prac-
tice can be condemned without an elaborate showing of market
power. That does not mean that market power is irrelevant, only that
the significance of market power varies with the strength of the com-
peting stories, or more precisely, with the positive amount by which
the strength of the anticompetitive story exceeds that of the procom-
petitive one.
Thus, the oath of office for an antitrust judge does not include a
solemn promise to disregard common sense. A judge can take notice
of the fact that the geographic scope of dental services markets tends
to be local, that the only suppliers in the product market are likely to
be licensed dentists, and that if all of the dentists in a community
agree to a restraint, they are likely to have market power.193 That
kind of evidence, coupled with a strong anticompetitive story and a
weak procompetitive one, should be enough for the plaintiff to satisfy
its burden of persuasion. Conversely, a strong anticompetitive story
should be defeated by conclusive proof of the absence of market
power regardless of the weakness of the procompetitive story. Such a
principle is necessary to protect experimentation in the economy and
to allow defendants to select the cheapest way to respond to antitrust
complaints. In all, the weaker the anticompetitive story is, the
193. For example, in FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986), den-
tists in three communities agreed not to submit x-rays to insurance companies in con-junction with claim forms. The Supreme Court held that the record adequately sup-
ported an order of the FTC finding an antitrust violation. Id. at 466. On the one hand,
the agreement arguably raised the costs incurred by insurance companies in verifying
that the dental services performed were necessary and therefore covered by the patients'
policies, and this, in turn, could have raised the price of premiums by increasing either
the amount of reimbursement paid out or the costs of determining coverage. There was
evidence that insurance companies actually had been unable to obtain compliance with
their requests for x-rays in two of the affected communities over a period of years and
that they had experienced little difficulty in other areas. Id. at 457. On the other hand,
the Court observed, "No credible argument has been advanced for the proposition that
making it more costly for the insurers and patients who are dentists' customers to obtain
information needed for evaluating the dentists' diagnoses has any such procompetitive
effect." Id. at 459. Thus, to the Court, there was a strong anticompetitive story and a
weak procompetitive one. Moreover, the Court recited the FTC's finding that participat-
ing dentists "constituted heavy majorities of the practicing dentists" in two localities -
nearly I00 percent of the dental specialists in one community and approximate 67 per-
cent of the dentists in another. Id. at 451, 460. Therefore, there was evidence of market
power. The Court noted that the FTC's decision found support "in common sense and
economic theory, upon both of which the FTC may reasonably rely. . . ." Id. at 456. Nodoubt, federal courts have similar latitude to rely on common sense and economic theory.
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weaker the procompetitive story or the showing of lack of market
power need be to defeat the complaint.
When the anticompetitive and procompetitive stories are both
strong, but market power is obviously absent, the defendants should
win. Problems arise when the competing stories are equally strong
and a quick look at market power is inconclusive. That case requires
an elaborate inquiry into market power and, unless that inquiry per-
mits a conclusive finding that market power is absent, an attempt to
quantify procompetitive and anticompetitive effects. That case re-
quires the classic evaluation of reasonableness because there is no
alternative. But many cases, perhaps most, can be resolved without
reaching that point.
This analysis is not consistent with all Supreme Court precedent.
The antitrust principle that is consistent with all of the Court's opin-
ions has yet to be identified. However, it is consistent with many
cases. Certainly the Court's explicit and implicit exposition of the
elements of the analysis as they relate to individual cases can be
criticized, but for the most part, the elements themselves can be
found in the Court's recent opinions, and they are often implicitly
used in the ways suggested.""'
B. Analytical Guidelines
This analysis cannot and is not intended to demonstrate that par-
ticular kinds of professional rules are always either procompetitive or
anticompetitive. To the contrary, it implies that any given rule has to
be evaluated in the context in which it is challenged. Although the
concept of the flexible rule of reason is generally applicable, the fore-
going analysis of professional rules suggests various specific inquiries
that are subsumed in the elements of the basic approach. These in-
194. For example, in National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. University of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85 (1984), the Court perceived a strong anticompetitive theory with respect to
an agreement to restrict the number of college football games televised, coupled with
proof of anticompetitive effects - fewer games were televised and the prices paid by
advertisers for promotional time were higher. The Court found that the proffered effi-
ciency justifications were relatively insubstantial. And it noted, "As a factual matter, it is
evident that petitioner does possess market power." Id. at 111. See also FTC v. Indiana
Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986), discussed at supra note 193. The most notable
exception to this analysis is United States v. Nat'l Soc'y of Professional Eng'r, 389 F.
Supp. 1193, (D.D.C. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 1031 (1975), a ff'd in part & modified in
part, 555 F.2d 978 (1977), affid, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). See also note 147 and accompa-
nying text. In Professional Engineers, the Court identified a strong anticompetitive the-
ory and some supporting evidence, but saw no cognizable procompetitive theory. It ap-
parently ignored substantial evidence of a lack of market power.
quiries suggest certain guidelines that are useful in assessing the
strength of the anticompetitive story, the strength of the procompeti-
tive story, and the existence or non-existence of market power.
1. PROFESSIONAL RULES ARE RESTRAINTS ONLY IF AND AS EN-
FORCED. If rules are to restrain behavior, they must prevent those
restrained from doing something that they would otherwise do. Sup-
pliers could agree to fix prices without creating an enforcement
mechanism, hoping that all recognize the disastrous effects of cheat-
ing and exercise self-discipline, but even such a rare agreement is
likely to be so short-lived as to warrant little expenditure of enforce-
ment resources. Unenforced "restraints" can be ignored. Restraints
that are enforced may bear close or little resemblance to the written
rule. A rule may be interpreted more or less restrictively. The anti-
trust significance of a rule depends upon how it is understood by
those subject to it and that, in turn, depends upon how it is enforced.
2. PRIVATE ASSOCIATION RULES THAT ARE NOT ALSO EMBODIED IN
LAW ARE LESS LIKELY TO INJURE WELFARE THAN THOSE THAT ARE.
An association cannot enforce its purely private rules unless mem-
bership is economically important. If membership is important, there
is a dangei that it is so because of the rules. If an association has
power to affect price solely because its members offers more highly
valued services than do other professionals, the rules cannot be con-
demned by an antitrust court without reducing welfare. A rule can
be unrelated to any productive economic activity and cause an an-
ticompetitive effect, but it will often be difficult in practice to deter-
mine that the rule is unrelated to the source of the association's eco-
nomic power. Moreover, economic rents may be necessary to
compensate the association for risk inherent in establishing itself in
the market, and therefore to stimulate such ventures in the future.
And the anticompetitive effect of private rules that generate unnec-
essary monopoly rents is susceptible to erosion, as competition from
non-members and members of rival associations grows. The costs of
erroneously condemning a rule are likely to be much higher than the
costs of erroneously permitting one. Consequently, unless the rule
clearly serves no efficiency-enhancing function, it should be
permitted.
The ability to enforce an anticompetitive restraint is much more
likely to emanate from the power of the state than from the eco-
nomic power of the association. Though government adoption of a
rule is not determinative of anticompetitive effect or intent, it is very
nearly a necessary condition of significant economic harm. Suppose
the Czar of Economic Matters had to choose between two states: a
society devoid of government regulation, with an attendant adverse
impact on the maintenance of value-enhancing property rights and
the elimination of informational asymmetries on the one hand; and
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one ordered by statutory and administrative restrictions that might
or might not increase welfare on the other. The Czar would do well
to choose the former. The expected costs of error are lower. Of
course, a professional rule that is consonant with a legal mandate,
though it may therefore have the power to reduce welfare, is likely to
be protected from antitrust attack by the state action doctrine.
3. PURELY PRIVATE RULES OF AN ASSOCIATION THAT ATTEMPT TO
LIMIT MEMBERSHIP TO A SMALL PART OF THE PROFESSION ARE NOT
LIKELY TO BE ANTICOMPETITIVE. If an association is relying upon un-
related economic power to enforce an anticompetitive rule, it will
have to suppress competition. Its incentive will be to extend its influ-
ence to as large a proportion of the actual and potential suppliers in
a market as it can. Though a market may be smaller than a profes-
sion, individuals in the same profession that are outside of the mar-
ket are the most likely entrants. Thus, the anticompetitive associa-
tion that is not supported by government action will generally try to
force as large a percentage of a profession to join the association as
it can.
4. A PURELY PRIVATE RULE THAT IS ADOPTED WHEN AN ASSOCIA-
TION ACCOUNTS FOR A SMALL PART OF A PROFESSION IS UNLIKELY TO
BE ANTICOMPETITIVE EVEN IF THE ASSOCIATION HAS GROWN TO EN-
COMPASS A LARGE PART OF THE PROFESSION BY THE TIME THE RULE
IS CHALLENGED. There is an inference, though not an inescapable
one, that if a rule is adopted when an association has no market
power, and the association thereafter grows to possess market power,
the rule increases welfare. In other words, any economic power the
association has is not likely to be independent of the rule. The rule
could not have been anticompetitive when adopted, and so unless the
rule. initially had no effect, it must have increased welfare in the
beginning. A single rule can have a procompetitive effect at one time
and a different effect as the market structure evolves, but that is not
likely. An association could deliberately adopt a rule that is intended
to lie dormant until market conditions permit it to have an anticom-
petitive effect, but that ascribes to an ordinary group of professionals
a degree of perspicacity that is difficult to believe. More likely, an
association could adopt a rule simply because it observes that an-
other association in the same or a different profession has the rule.
The similarity of rules across professions suggests some amount of
sheer mimicry. In that event, a welfare-enhancing explanation for
the rule based on the rule's presumed initial effect, though it is not
precluded by the rule's undeliberate origin, is less compelling. Still,
the most persuasive explanation for a rule that is adopted when an
association is small is that it was and remains procompetitive.
5. THE INTENT OF AN ASSOCIATION IN ADOPTING A RULE, TO THE
EXTENT IT CAN BE 'DISCERNED, CAN BE SUGGESTIVE BUT IS NOT
LIKELY TO BE DETERMINATIVE OF THE RULE'S EFFECT. Intent evidence
will often be unavailable. When it is, it has to be used very carefully.
Evidence that a rule was designed to address some problem in the
market, such as fraudulent practices, however unartfully the expla-
nation is articulated, suggests that the rule has a welfare-enhancing
effect. The lack of an articulate explanation is not likely to be sug-
gestive of an anticompetitive effect. Clear evidence of an anticompe-
titive intent, understood to mean an intent to harm consumers, may
suggest an anticompetitive effect. In practice, the only intent evi-
dence that is likely to have significant probative value is evidence of
intent to respond to the conduct of professionals that causes consum-
ers some kind of discrete and identifiable harm.
6. DETERMINING THE COMPETITIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF ANY RULE
MAY REQUIRE EXAMINATION OF OTHER RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION.
Although one cannot infer that all of an association's rules are an-
ticompetitive because one rule is proven to be, the effect of any par-
ticular rule may be impossible to discern without examining the pri-
vate regulatory context in which it exists. A rule may appear more
or less sinister when it is viewed in relation to other rules of the
association.
7. A RULE THAT HAS A PROVEN EFFECT IN ONE PROFESSIONAL SER-
VICES MARKET MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE THE SAME EFFECT IN AN-
OTHER MARKET. Empirical evidence of the effect of a particular kind
of conduct restriction in one market is suggestive of its effect in an-
other. But relevant economic characteristics will virtually never be
identical across professions. Whether economic characteristics are
relevant or not will depend upon the anticompetitive or procompeti-
tive theory that underlies the effect in the market in which the effect
is known. Obviously, the closer the professions are in the characteris-
tics that drive the relevant theory, the more powerful the evidence
will be.
8. AN EXPLANATION FOR A RULE WILL BE MORE OR LESS PERSUA-
SIVE AS THE OBSERVED CONDUCT CORRESPONDS MORE OR LESS
CLOSELY TO THAT PREDICTED BY THE RELEVANT THEORY. This guide-
line is almost too self-evident to recite. But it is so important that I
shall risk insulting the reader. For example, if the theory used to
explain a rule depends upon an increase in the marginal costs of sup-
ply, there has to be a convincing demonstration that the rule causes
professionals to incur significantly higher marginal costs of supplying
services than they otherwise would. Is the economic function to
which the rule relates a significant part of the total costs of supply?
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Does the rule force the professional to substitute activities that are
significantly more expensive? If the theory depends upon increasing
search costs, there has to be credible evidence that search costs of a
substantial percentage of the buyers in the market would increase
significantly by virtue of the rule. If the theory depends upon an
association reducing search costs by certifying quality, there must be
credible evidence that consumers look for association-affiliation when
selecting a professional.
These guidelines admittedly contain no sharp edges. But then
there is little steel to be found anywhere in the inquiry into the anti-
trust significance of professional rules. There simply is no substitute
in this area for thorough investigation and tough analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
The rules of professional associations are inviting antitrust targets.
They represent formal agreements among competitors. They fre-
quently appear to restrain commercial behavior. They are often en-
forced through elaborate infrastructures. And they are frequently
urged upon and adopted by government entities. Therefore, they typ-
ically satisfy the legal requirements for close scrutiny. They even ful-
fill the conditions many economists would use to identify restraints
that are likely to reduce welfare - they are horizontal, and they
may be manifestations of economic capture. They are buffalo lum-
bering alongside the tracks of the Atcheson, Topeka and the
Antitrust.
They are not 'what they seem. To be sure, some rules of some as-
sociations reduce economic welfare, and a subset of these undoubt-
edly violate the antitrust laws. A great accomplishment in recent
years has been the articulation and elaboration of theories of an-
ticompetitive harm. However, less attention, however, has been de-
voted to welfare-increasing explanations, which depend either on the
tendency of rules to reduce the costs of supply or on their capacity to
increase the quality of services rendered. In particular, rules may
create an efficient system of private property rights designed to over-
come vexing informational asymmetries inherent in markets for pro-
fessional services. In fact, given the contexts of many rules, including
their histories, the characteristics of the associations, and the struc-
tures of the markets, efficiency-enhancing explanations will often be
the most powerful.
There is no easy way to distinguish between rules that increase
welfare and those that do not. Consequently, modes of legal analysis
that preclude consideration of factors that determine economic sig-
nificance are fundamentally flawed. Hard work cannot be avoided in
economics; it cannot be avoided in law. Principles of antitrust analy-
sis can be and are best understood to permit, indeed to require, the
necessary undertaking. Though some guidelines can be gleaned from
the theories of benefit and injury and from the history of professional
rules, in the end, they will only make a difficult task a little easier.
